Date: September 1905
Location: London
Speaker: Aga Khan III
Source: Speeches of Aga Khan III – K K Aziz
Full Text
Reasons for his interest in the defence of India – the Russian threat – boundaries between India and Russia – need for buffer states the British presence in India through conquest or by force of circumstances – majority of Indians appreciate British rule – Russia could exploit the disaffection among the Indians who resent British rule – proposals for neutral buffer zones – the British should refrain from acquiring predominance in the neutral zones – instead win confidence of countries like Afghanistan – implications for the army of a contiguous border with Russia – make use of local resources to strengthen the Indian army- reorganise the troops of the native States and utilise them for India’s defence.
I owe an apology to the readers of this influential Review for placing before them the following observations. It may well be considered extremely rash for a non-military man to express any opinion on such a technical subject as the one which I propose to treat in this paper, knowing, as I do, that the ablest men in the service of this Empire, and some of the most instructed of our public writers have made the subject a life-long study, and have devoted their most careful attention to it, more especially since the first Mghan war. For another reason also an apology is, I think, due from me to my readers, since, although acquainted with it from my childhood, the English language is not my mother tongue, and it may perhaps be hazardous for me to give expression to my thoughts and views in a language that is not my own. My excuse for doing so is that for more than eight years I have studied the question of the defence of India in its wider aspects with great care, and I may add that I have read, and in some cases re-read, most of the valuable books, articles, and despatches which have at any time been published on the subject.
Moreover, being myself an Asiatic, I have not only had opportuni ties of visiting many of the regions which form the landward boundaries of India to the west, north, and east; but I have regularly received from people in those climes various kinds of information that do not ordinarily reach the ears of the soldier or the statesman.
For the same reason I have had the good fortune of becoming acquainted with the state of political affairs in Arabia, Persia, Mesopotamia, Afghanistan, and Chinese Turkestan. Knowing the political condition of the peoples of those countries, I have been irresistibly led to the conclusion that the maintenance of British rule in India is of vital necessity for the welfare of its 300 millions of people. It was this conclusion which tumed my attention to the interesting problem how to safeguard India not only against foreign invasion, but also against the equally dangerous process, in the long run, of the increase of foreign moral influence within her borders. There are, if one carefully considers the matter, only two Powers which can ever really dangerously threaten British rule in India: China and Russia. The other European Powers in Asia, and also the Japanese, depend on the sea for their communications, and so long as British naval supremacy is assured, they can never become sources of real danger to India.
The Asiatic States, with the exception of China, have, on the other hand, neither the population nor the resources for ever becoming a real menace to India …
We may, therefore, devote all our attention to Russia, since she alone has shown a desire to extend her dominions towards India.
As a rodent gnaws ceaselessly through every barrier and obstacle placed in its path, and whenever disturbed or interrupted, stops gnawing for a time only to resume it with all the greater vigour – so Russia has gnawed her way through Central Asia, drawing ever nearer and nearer to the frontiers of India. One of the favourite methods in this process with which we have become familiar has been the sending of ‘scientific expeditions’ to the regions marked down for conquest. Another has been the employment of natives of the country coveted for the purpose of weakening its indigenous Government, and then when the fruit had become ripe to pluck it. Sometimes, indeed, as on “the bloody day of Geok Tepe,” Russia has advanced with a big army; but, although the method has varied, the result has been the same, and it has gratified Russia’s tremendous desire to come southwards, and right on to the Indian frontier.
Those who in any way have taken part in the discussion on the question of our relations with Russia in Asia may be divided, roughly speaking, into two main classes. Each of these classes may consist of several subdivisions differing from each other in questions of detail, but we need only concern ourselves with the two main bodies enunciating opposing principles. The first is composed of those who advocate a “forward policy” so that the boundaries of Russia in Central Asia may become contiguous to those of the British Empire of India on the west and north; and, perhaps, also, on the north-east. In India these persons are known as favouring what is called “a running frontier” with Russia.
The second class of authorities advocate the interposition of a wide neutral zone – really independent buffer States – between the possessions of Russia and the boundaries of India proper. I frankly confess that I belong to the latter class, and I will here state my reasons for this, briefly, but without any reservation.
It must ever be remembered that the position of England in India is essentially and fundamentally different from that of the French Government in France, or of the German in Germany, or even of the Russian Government in Central Asia. The Power that rules in France and Germany is not alien to the people. The nation in those countries, if dissatisfied with its Government, whether it be a confederation of dynasties as in Germany or a Republic as in France, can change it and set up some fresh system. But in such cases it would always be only the form of the Government and the personnel of the administration that would be changed. Without going into the question of a “social con tract” on which some philosophers based the origin of every Government, it is enough for our purpose to say that the indigenous government of every country must owe its origin, or is assumed to owe its origin, to the expressed or implied con sensus of its people, or of the large majority of them. The Government which exercised authority in England after the Norman conquest may at its inception have been foreign; but in the course of centuries the rulers and the ruled have become welded and fused into one people and one nation. Thus to-day it cannot be said that the ruling dynasty in Great Britain is a foreign dynasty, or that Great Britain is governed by foreign rulers. Similarly the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Rom anoffs, and in Persia the Kajjars, and in China the Manchus, may or may not have been foreigners in those countries when they began to rule; but now not one of those States can be considered to be under foreign rule in the sense in which India is at the present time. The present rulers of India have found themselves therein either by conquest, or by force of circumstances, or by the will of Providence, but certainly not by the will of its peoples.
Nor is there any likelihood of the rulers and the ruled, within the next few centuries, becoming fused or welded into one nation or one people in the European sense of the words. To begin with, there is no Indian· nation at present, and even if in time the peoples of the country get fused into a single nation, they will differ too much in colour, race, and climatic characteristics ever to become one with their English fellow subjects. For the last half century a belief has been gaining ground in this congeries of races, which has now deepened into a conviction with the majority, that alien as the British rule is in India, it is the best of all the governments that the country has ever possessed, and that under its tutelage India has prospered, and its peoples advanced in a manner unapproached during any period of the past.
Beyond a doubt the moJority of the Indian peoples are convinced of the benefits of British rule, and feel devoted loyalty to the person of their Emperor.
But among 300 millions of people, there must be naturally some who . . . could be seduced from their loyalty to an alien Government, and would fall easy victims to the intrigues or the specious promises of Russia, if once that country became a neigh bour of India, and if its railways were united with the Indian lines. It must be remembered that the Russian official classes are perfect adepts in intrigue, and that they would be profuse in making promises as to a coming millennium for all Asiatic races under Russia. Even already some Russian intriguers who have reached India have promised the establishment of a thousand native dynasties.
But even if Russia did not lend herself to intrigue, her very presence on the other side of the boundaries of India would be a disturbing element, for it would unsettle the native mind and create new hopes and new aspirations. It was Lord Dalhousie who said “We enjoy peace because we are strong.” This remark is as true to-day as it was more than half a century ago. But the causes of strength are not merely military, moral, and economi cal[sic.]. One main cause is the absence of another strong and rival Power in the immediate vicinity, and having its boundaries contiguous to those of India. Russia, in Central Asia, has but 10 millions of Asiatics to govern, while England in India has 300 millions. Knowing what Russia is, I say that if her territory lay immediately on the other side of the Indian frontier, it would prove a very hotbed for fostering sedition and disloyalty in India.
Moreover, the constant and unrestrained intercourse that would necessarily follow between that territory and India would result in the spreading of such sedition and disloyalty throughout India as might lead to constant troubles, and eventually to the weak ening of the authority of the British Government, and possibly even to its overthrow.
For these reasons certain regions west, north, and east of India should be kept as buffers between that country and Russia, and Russia should be made to understand distinctly that any overstep ping of the limits which may be thus set to her ambition would be treated as a casus belli, and would be followed by hostilities.
Great Britain should also make up her mind to fight once for all to keep Russia out of the neutral zone or buffer region.
What are the regions that we must keep Russia out of? Since the object of keeping her away from these regions is not essen tially military, but rather fundamentally to prevent her disturbing India, we must carefully consider what are the lands· that do influence Indian thought, and that are near enough to be fre quented by Indians. For reasons historical as well as geographical, because these lands have been closely associated with the desti nies of India, I would suggest that the regions to be kept as a neutral zone should begin with Mesopotamia in the extreme west, and include the Shat-ul-Arab, the Hassa, and Oman along the western shore of the Persian Gulf. Coming further east, the whole of Persia, south of Azerbaijan, Teheran, and Khorassan, forms an essential part of the buffer region, as also does the kingdom of Mghanistan. I would also include the southern dis tricts of the present province of Chinese Turkestan with the important towns of Yarkand and Khotan, Thibet, and lastly the two Chinese provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan.
I have now named the territories which it appears to me to be necessary to preserve as a neutral zone for the security oflndia.
Possibly these may be considered too extensive, and a more restricted area may be deemed sufficient, and certainly it may be allowed that some of the regions indicated can be left untouched and undefined for the present. But whatever is considered neces sary and sufficient should be declared “a neutral zone” after due deliberation by England as a whole, and not by a single party, and the Empire should unanimously accept that decision as a sort of Monroe Doctrine for Asia to be defended and enforced at all hazards by “war from pole to pole” (to use the words of the great and distinguished author of Russia in Central Asia) against any European Power that directly or indirectly sought to predominate over any part of the zone thus defined.
However, England, in order to enforce the policy of a neutral zone, must herself observe the self-denying ordinance, and not allow herself to be led by the advocates of a forward policy, or those officers who are tired of Mghan arrogance and Persian and Chinese pusillanimity, into acquiring a predominant position in any part of the neutral zone under one pretext or another. If, for example, instead of interfering with the affairs of Mghanistan, and constantly fretting because we have no railways and no politi cals in that country, or seeking to forcibly extend “influence” there, we took care to inform its ruler and people that we should be ready to defend them if attacked by any foreign Power, but that otherwise we should let their country severely alone, and that we were resolved to follow the policy which in Lord Lawrence’s time was known as “masterly inactivity,” we should inspire them with confidence and win their friendship. Surely it was a man without the sense of humour who evolved the principle of forcing people into friendship, as advocated by some of the forward school. Again a want of knowledge of human nature is evident in people who maintain that Orientals respect only such men and Powers as bully them. Passionate though silent hatred, not respect, is the consequence of the high-handed use of force, and the breaking up of treaties, even amongst Oriental peoples.
The conquest and acquisition by England of territories beyond India proper is far more dangerous to us than the absorption of those lands by Russia would be. In the first place, we should have to fight the invader far away from our natural base, which is in itself a great drawback, as has been demonstrated by history both modern and ancient. Secondly, the population of the conquered countries would be at heart hostile to us; for though their Govern ments might be bad, they were in a sense national Governments, and they would make common cause with the invader, however foolish and shortsighted such a course might appear, just to get revenge on those who had upset their national institutions. These annexations would even furnish a further cause of moral disturb ance in India … To my mind the right policy is to insist that the territories constituting the neutral zone should remain inviolate, and free from aggression by any Power, and that they should be independent in fact and in name. The policy that I advocate is precisely the same as that pursued by the United States towards the South American Republics. If we consistently follow this policy, if the Conservative party will dissociate itself from the extreme “forward school” that wants to turn Mghanistan into a “native State,” and southern Persia into a “Malay State,” if the Liberal party will sever its policy from the ultra-altruists who invite Russia to the doors of India – then the would-be invader of India would, in the first place, have to subjugate portions of the neutral zone before advancing upon India, and their populations would naturally fight for their own freedom, and to that extent would be our allies and fight our battles. Then our assistance would be received with gratitude, and without any suspicion of our good faith.
Another absolutely important reason for our pursuing the policy of neutral zones and buffer States, and of preventing the extension of either the Russian or the British Empire till they meet, is that while our present army in India is nearly – though not quite – sufficient for our needs, it would, in the case of a “running frontier,” require to be at least three times its actual strength. Although she had only the extreme eastern frontier of Russia as her neighbour, Japan kept a force of a million men ready. The Imperial forces in India all told are now less than a quarter of a million. If we trebled the army in India, we should have to treble the European troops as well as the native sepoys.
To find men for that purpose would be a feat that no Herculean Secretary of State for War could do without a tremendous increase of pay for Mr. Tommy Atkins. But even assuming that men for such an enormously increased English army were by great increase of pay to be found, who, out of a lunatic asylum, would venture to say that India could bear the strain of a trebled military budget?
If any India within our powers of conception could not pay for the increased army that would thus have become necessary not through any fault of its own, but because its rulers had chosen to extend their conquests beyond its frontiers, without allowing the peoples of India a voice in the matter, would the British taxpayers consent to contribute a mere bagatelle of some 25 or 30 millions sterling a year? It would be the men sent out indirectly by the British taxpayers to govern India that would decree and make these new conquests, and theirs would be the doubtful honour and glory thereof, and theirs the responsibility and liab ility of retaining and safeguarding the new conquests. I who have lived in England off and on for many years, and even went out of my way to study not only the ruling classes but the taxpayer, the man par excellence who, personally unknown, is yet the mainstay of the Empire – I know the average British taxpayer fairly well. ~e will ungrudgingly pay for a predominating navy, and will give, perhaps with a wry face, the necessary millions for a just sufficient army. But, I think, when a new annual bill of 30 millions sterling was presented to him, he would curse the people who had taken his peaceful Indian frontier up to the menacing lines of Russia, and he would refuse to pay this enormous and senseless fine.
India could not pay for the increased military expenditure, and John Bull would not.
Even if the present system of voluntary enlistment were replaced by conscription, such a change would not mend matters.
To begin with, it is doubtful if a conscript would ever do garrison work on foreign soil, thousands of miles distant from home and friends. Secondly a conscript army must be a short-service army, and the increased portion of the British army would be needed not in England, but opposite the Russian lines on the Asiatic frontier. As it is, with a comparatively long-service army, the waste and expense of transport is enormous, and once real short service of two years was introduced, as would have to be done on the adoption of conscription, then the constant change of drafts would become such a terrible waste, for it would be annual, that millions would be thrown away in merely bringing and taking away the troops to and from India. Above all, even limited con scription is not yet popular amongst the English masses, and though, I think, for home defence it would be a good thing, still, a conscript army in India would, I am persuaded, be found impossible.
We are thus forced back to the policy of a neutral zone and buffer States. But, as I have already said, such a policy must be honestly and disinterestedly carried out, and above all must be rigidly enforced against every delinquent. For the successful carrying out of such a policy, we require, though a much smaller force than for the other policy of a “running frontier” with Russia, a thoroughly efficient army, and also the proper hus banding of the fighting forces of India. We are exceptionally lucky in having at this moment one of the greatest of European soldiers, and one of the ablest organisers the world has seen since Carnot, in Lord Kitchener at the head of the Indian army.
If he is given a free hand, and, above all, left in India long enough to finish his great work (for even he can do little if he has to vacate his post after five short years), then, with a comparatively small increase in the expense of the Indian army, we shall have a force well able to carry out the policy of main taining neutral zones beyond India.
Besides the regular army maintained at the cost of British India, there is a great deal of fighting material and other resources in India which are at present absolutely frittered away. I refer to the thousands of men in uniform shouldering antiquated weapons, who are kept up by the native States. These States are protected from attack by each other, and also against foreign invasion, by the strong arm of the Indian Government. Under these circumstances it is utterly useless and extravagant to main tain these unorganised and undisciplined hordes. These States pay a small tribute to the Indian Government, totally dispro portionate to the expense they would have had to incur for the maintenance of an army sufficiendy strong to make them secure against attack by their neighbours or by a foreign Power, as well as to the ouday of the Indian Government direcdy and indirecdy for that purpose.
The Indian Government in common fairness to the British Indian taxpayer should order these useless hordes to be dis banded. Some portion of these troops do police duty; but for this they should be replaced by regular and recognised policemen and gendarmes. For the serious business of the defence of India against foreign invasion, which is as much a duty and a necessity for the native States as it is for the Indian Government, every State must be made to keep a certain humber of Imperial Service troops in proportion to its revenue, and also no troops but those for Imperial Service should be permitted.
These corps should be considered part of the regular army, and placed under the commander-in-chief. Their headquarters, however, should be left in the States that pay for their mainten ance, and the respective corps should carry the emblems of their princely houses. Every year they ought to be exercised and brigaded with the British army, and they should have on the establishment European inspectors. The regimental officers of all grades should be appointed from native nobles who had been trained in the Imperial Cadet Corps. The troops of the native States thus reorganised would be a material addition of strength to the fighting power of the country, and would, there is litde doubt, acquit themselves in actual war against a foreign foe with as much credit as the regular army.
This very question was raised in the Supreme Legislative Council some years ago, but nothing seems to have come out of the discussion. As probably nine out of every ten chiefs would heartily approve of such a patriotic change, which would increase their importance and usefulness, it is high time that the ques~on should be seriously taken up by approaching the native States in a proper and definite manner. Perhaps a committee composed of several princes who can “think imperially,” some civilians, two or three military officers, and perhaps a few independent individuals not in the services, might be formed to make a scien tific and thorough study of the question, and prepare a scheme for the effective utilisation of the armies of the native States in the defence of India.
The spirit of the ruling chiefs of India is, I think, made clearly apparent by an anecdote relating to one of the greatest and most powerful of her ruling princes, which I venture to repeat. It was at the time of the last Delhi Durbar, that one morning I saw H.H.
Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior riding with a single trooper in close attendance. In answer to a casual question from me as to whether the trooper was one of the Imperial Service troops, his Highness replied that “all his troops, without any distinction, were for Imperial Service, and that he himself was an Imperial soldier.”
I am afraid I have already trespassed too much on the patience of my readers; but I feel that I owe a duty to both India and England, countries that seem, by Providence, to be so designed that their welfare and happiness can only be complete when they are thoroughly united. I have pointed out what I consider the greatest danger to our Indian Empire – namely, the extension of the frontier up to that of Russia …
Source: The Nineteenth Century and After, London, September 1905, pp. 367-75.
The journal, a prestigious and influential monthly, was at this time edited by James Knowles.
Much was written, then and later, on the nature, scope and ramifications of the imperial clash between the British Indian Empire and Russia. A short selection: Lady Betty Balfour, The History of Lord Lytton s Administration, 1876 to 1880, Compiled from Letters and Official Papers, London, 1899; John Adye, Indian Frontier Policy: An Historical Sketch, London, 1897; G. J. Alder, British Indias Northern Frontier, 1865-1895: A Study in Imperial History, London, 1963; Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 500 B.C.-A.D. 1957, London, 1958; Richard Temple, The Story of My Life, London, 1896, 2 vols; John Strachey, India, London, 1888, rev. ed 1894; Muhammad Anwar Khan, England, Russia and Central Asia: A Study in Diplomacy, 1857-1878, Peshawar, 1963; D. P. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 1876-1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations, St Lucia, 1963; A. P. Thornton, The File on Empire: Essays and Reviews, London, 1968; and the following unpublished theses: A. W. Preston, “British Military Policy and the Defence of India: A study of British Military Policy, Plans and Preparations During the Russian Crisis, 1876-1880”, London, Ph.D. 1966; Bhag Singh, “Anglo-Russian Relations in the Middle East since 1907, with special reference to India”, California, Ph.D., 1935; G. S. Papadopoulos, “England and the Near East, 1896-1898”, London, Ph.D., 1950; R. R.J. Mulligan, “Great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 1908-1923”, London, M.A., 1953; R. L. Kirkpatrick, “British Imperial Policy, 1874-1880”, Oxford, D.Phil., 1933; and M.J.Jennings, “Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Mghanistan, 1882-1886”, London, M.A., 1953.