Date: January 1911
Location: London
Speaker: Aga Khan III
Source: Speeches of Aga Khan III – K K Aziz
Full Text
Tribute to Lord Minto – reasons for the reforms – their main features – Muslim rights and interests – appointment of an Indian to the Executive Council-Lord Minto’s dialogue with the Princes and Protected States- relations with Mghanistan- Lord Minto’s achievements – some omissions, e.g., the Cadet Corps – no scope for Indians in the army – Indian aristocracy should have access to the army – tribute to Lady Minto.
After a dozen years of almost continuous service as the represen tative of his Sovereign, first in the great Dominion of Canada, and then in India, Lord Minto has returned to his own country, with the consciousness of duty well and bravely done in the midst of difficulties such as few Indian viceroys have ever had to face.
The profound regard and goodwill of the Indian people are with him, for they recognise that in difficult and perplexing times he has displayed not only those characteristics of the true English gentleman which Indians can always understand and appreciate, but also less expected gifts of statesmanship that have been of incalculable value at a critical stage in the history of Britain’s rule in India.
Before Lord Minto started for Calcutta, he told his friends at a private banquet in his honour in London that he felt some diffidence in succeeding a brilliant ruler who, in perfecting the machinery of State, had given evidence of abilities and talents which his successor could not hope to emulate; and yet, he added, with a touch of humour, his racing days had taught him that many a race had been won by giving the horse a rest in his gallop. But very soon after Lord Minto’s arrival in CalCutta he recognised that mere breathing-space from the overhauling of departments and from strenuous raising of the standards of administrative efficiency would entirely fail to meet the needs of the situation. He saw, as in a lightning flash, that when the people asked for the bread of political advancement they would not and could not be satisfied with the stone of mere adminis trative efficiency, however valuable the latter might be from many points of view. He saw there must be a positive and not merely a negative policy; that the time had come for conciliating the moderate and loyal classes who were anxious to have a fuller share in shaping the affairs of their country. He saw that they had been discouraged by the long number of years that had passed without anything very definite and practical being done to keep the pledges of an earlier time, particularly those of Queen Victoria’s gracious Proclamation.
Not only had nothing been done for many years to interpret these pledges in a broad and generous spirit; but it seemed as though English statesmen had forgotten that they were ever meant to be fulfilled. The position was becoming positively dangerous to the stability of British rule, much more dangerous, indeed, than the anarchical movement that was beginning to appear on the surface of the body politic in India, though so utterly alien to the traditions and outlook of the people. While the anti-British and disloyal section was ready and eager to damage the Government both morally and materially, the vast and loyal solid majority had been so discouraged by the want of any substantial political advancement that there was real risk of their sulking in their camps, and standing aside while the Government addressed itself to the task of repressing the seditious elements. The danger arose from the effect of this situation in assisting the leaven of discontent to work among the masses. In the phrase afterwards employed by Lord Morley, it was necessary to “rally the Moderates,” and thus to cut the ground from the feet of those who argued that Government disregard of Indian aspirations justified sullen resentment, if not, indeed, passive or active resistance. It is no exaggeration to say that to Indian observers, British administration seemed in 1905 to be in danger of losing its moral authority over the best elements of Indian society.
Lord Minto realised that, to use his own words, the political atmosphere was “heavy and electric”; that influences were at work which the Government of India could not disregard; and that ambitions had come into existence the justice of which England could not deny. So far from resenting and seeking to check the political awakening, he saw, as he had told us, that it was but the ripening of the educational seed which British rule had systematically sown. It was, therefore, in no grudging and unwilling spirit that he recognised the signs of the times and attempted to deal with the new conditions. The pu~lished papers show that Lord Minto had been in the country only a few months when he penned a minute reviewing the political situation, and appointed a Committee of his Council to give form and substance to the constitutional ideas he had laid down therein. To quote the words of a Simla writer, he seized “with all the enthusiasm of a generous and sensitive spirit upon such hopes, projects and ideas as were already in the air, and made the minute of them which precipitated them into history.”
The resulting reforms, evolved after prolonged discussion, public and official, have been accepted with gratitude by all reasonable men as constituting a conspicuous ·and definite advance in the development of political institutions in India.
Their outstanding feature, as all the world knows, is the enlarge ment and reconstitution of the Legislatures, Imperial and Provincial, and a considerable increase of their powers. In the peculiar conditions of Indian life, the ship of constitutional reform would have foundered as soon as launched if the great Mussalman community had been left without due share in the benefits of the advance; but here Lord Minto’s prescience, at the earliest stage in the consideration of the constitutional changes, was of the highest value. He had been in the country less than twelve months when he assured a representative Moslem deputation of his hearty recognition of the principle that the political rights and interests of the comrp.unity must be safe guarded by distinct representation, and promised that they should be so safeguarded in any administrative reconstruction with which he was concerned. As leading Mussalmans have remarked in an appeal for a fund to commemorate Lord Minto’s rule, this declaration “is destined to remain a landmark in the history of Mahommedans, as from that time dates the recognition of their separate political existence in the polity of India.” In a few quarters the incorporation of such recognition in the reforms has been animadverted upon. But the principle would not seem to be in need of any defence when Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P., though opposed to it theoretically, has to admit that in respect to the assumption that India, the land, is sacred, “Indian Nationalism is Hinduism”; that “no Mahommedan can enter its Holy of Holies, where politics are transfigured by the presence of the gods into religious faiths, and where the struggle for civil freedom is transformed into the worship of the Hindu genius.”
Mr. MacDonald even seems to hint that the absorbing power of Hinduism, written so plainly on the social and religious history of the country, will in time swallow up Mahommedanism in India.* The fact that the rules and regulations for elections to the new Legislatures have, by general admission, worked well proves that no portion of the community has been placed at serious disadvantage by them.
In respect to no feature of the reform did Lord Minto show a clearer recognition of the need for discarding some of the tra ditions upon which administrative policy had been based than that of opening the Executive Councils to Indians. The proposal to select an Indian for the Viceroy’s Executive showed in a most effective manner that the policy of associating the people of the country more fully in its responsible administration was to be a reality and not a sham. Appointments to the Government of India are made by the Crown on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, but we have Lord Morley’s own authority for the statement that it was at Lord Minto’s “special instigation” that he was contemplating the nomination of an Indian; the step he said would have “the absolute and zealous approval and concurrence of Lord Minto.” (House of Lords, December 17, 1908.) Moreover, when the proposal he had thus originated was carried into effect, Lord Minto did all that was possible to ensure its success. The prophecies of some objectors when the new departure was under discussion that the Indian member would be in the Council but not of it, that there would be arcana imperii he would not share, have not been fulfilled. Lord Minto took care that Mr. Sinha should be as freely and unreservedly consulted as any other member of the Government; and he has borne testi mony to the “absolute fairness and broad-minded patriotism” which has always characterised the advice he so often sought from Mr. Sinha. In this, as in other ways, the late Viceroy may be said to have given concrete form to the new spirit he has infused into the Administration. The old idea of making the machinery as efficient as possible by undivided English supervisory agency and from the English standpoint, has given place to generous trust in Indians of good faith and loyalty, and the enlistment of their active co-operation.
We had further illustration of this attitude in Lord Minto’s *The Awakening of India. Hodder and Stoughton, 1910. decision to enter into communication with the Ruling Chiefs on the subject of Indian unrest. The replies of the Princes, as Mr.
Chirol has pointed out in detail in his “Indian Urirest,” showed that they appreciated and reciprocated the confidence reposed in them. Moreover, Lord Minto has carried out a like pro cedure in his general dealings with the Protected States. His speech at Udaipur in November 1909, was not only an admirable exposition of sound policy on the part of the Paramount Power; it was a faithful transcript of the principles of his own dealings with the States. He has most carefully avoided unnecessary inter ference in the management of their affairs; he has opposed anything like pressure on Durbars with a view t~ introducing British methods of administration, preferring that reforms should emanate from the Durbars themselves; he has recognised that “any attempt at complete uniformity and subservience to pre cedent” must be inimical to truly cordial arrangements; and he has consistently dealt with questions as they have arisen, “with reference to existing treaties, the merits of each case, antecedent circumstances, and the particular stage of development, feudal and constitutional, of individual principalities.” By stea~astly pursuing this policy, Lord Minto has drawn still closer the strong ties of sentiment and interest which bind the Native States to the Paramount Power. One of his latest acts in India was to announce to the Maharaja of Benares that in view of his unique position as much more than a zemindar he is to be given practically the status he has hitherto held honorifically as a Ruling Prince; and that the greater part of his Family Domains will be transferred to his direct rule. From first to last Lord Minto has been, not the stern pedagogue of the Indian Princes, but their steadfast friend and helper, stimulating to high standards of personal conduct and public policy by his confidence in them, rather than by anything like an irritating exercise of authority as the representative of the Emperor.
Nor has the late Viceroy confined the application of this spirit to the Chiefs to be found within the limits of British India. It was a happy inspiration which led him to invite the Ameer of Mghanistan [Habibullah] to make an extended tour in India, combining with it an assurance that there would be no effort to take advantage of his position as a guest of the Government to press for the settlement of given questions on lines con venient to his host. The Ameer crossed the border for pleasure and instruction, and the consideration shown him, together with the absence of a bargaining spirit, made an excellent impression on him which has since borne fruit in various ways. No doubt, Lord Minto had a considerable share in bringing about the change of nomenclature whereby the Ameer is officially addressed with the titular honour due to the undivided sover eignty he wields over the Afghan kingdom. In his dealings with the trans-frontier tribes Lord Minto seems to me to have been no less happy and well advised.
To have accomplished these great ends in the face of deeply seated timidity and prejudice, in contravention of traditions looked upon in some quarters as almost immutable; to have frankly and gladly met the changed conditions of the times; to have breathed a new spirit over the civil fabric of Anglo-Indian administration, even when engaged in the unwelcome and anxious task of cutting out the canker of sedition – these are achievements which will give Lord Minto a place of higher honour on the roll of Indian Viceroys than that assigned by history to some predecessors whose achievements may have attracted much more notice while in progress. The great change has been accomplished in circumstances of exceptional difficulty by an English gentleman who has shown his true nobility by his complete disregard of the arts of self-glorification. It might have been better if, on occasion, Lord Minto had been more careful to maintain the traditional authority of his great office in relation to Whitehall. But the truth is that on constitutional issues of this kind, Indian sentiment has not been stirred. The nice ties of “control,” “agency” and “initiative” have been regarded not only as capable of due readjustment now that attention has been called to them, but as entirely subsidiary to the dawn of a new spirit in British administration, under the guidance of Lord Minto, with the sympathetic and earnest co-operation of Lord Morley. It is felt that the consummation of that great change will be reached by the epoch-marking visit of the King-Emperor [George V] and his gracious Consort [Queen Mary], the announcement of which has filled the Indian mind with the keenest joy and has given a new impetus to the strong loyalty of the Indian peoples to the person of the Sovereign. It is one of the greatest of Lord Minto’s services to the country that he is known to have expressed his cordial approval when he was consulted as to the spontaneous and most gracious desire of his Majesty to give India this special mark of Royal favour. Nothing that I can conceive could more strongly attach the peoples of India to the Empire than this glorious and most statesmanlike decision of his Majesty.
Lord Minto’s work for India has been shown to be of such signal advantage that it is with reluctance I call attention to one omission in the application of the new spirit he has infused, but the importance of the subject compels me to say a word there upon. Lord Minto seems to have taken no serious step to promote the development of Indian co-operation in the. very direction where there was more lee-way to make up than in any other. The fact that the late Viceroy is himself a soldier by profession adds to one’s feeling of surprise that he seems to have given no heed to the lack of opportunity for Indian nobles and the younger sons of Ruling Princes to serve their Sovereign in the Army. Though necessarily very limited in its scope, Lord Curzon’s institution of the Imperial Cadet Corps as a means of training for selected scions of noble houses to secure com missions in the Army was an important step towards remedying this state of things. But Lord Minto, owing presumably to the anxious preoccupations of the last five years, has done little or nothing to encourage or develop the Cadet Corps, and the general question has been left untouched. The case for advance ment has been briefly but effectively put by Mr. Chirol in his memorable and invaluable articles, now happily available in his book on “Indian Unrest” (p. 328):
Whilst, subject to the maintenance of effective executive control, we have extended, and must continue steadily to extend, the area of civil employment for Indians in the service of the State, there would certainly seem to be room also for affording them increased opportunities of military employ ment. It is a strange anomaly that at a time when we have no hesitation in introducing Indians into our Executive Councils, those who serve the King-Emperor in the Indian Army can only rise to quite subordinate rank. A good deal has no doubt been done to improve the quality of the native officer from the point of view of military education, but, under present conditions, the Indian Army does not offer a career that can attract Indians of good position, though it is just among the landed aristocracy and gentry of India that military traditions are combined with the strongest traditions of loyalty.
Men of wealth and standing cannot be expected to enter the Army so long as the Indian officer in the Regulars can never rise above the position of a squadron or company officer, and has little or no prospect of due recognition of his work and position when his period of active service is completed. That there are grave military disadvantages, likely to be acutely felt in the event of a great war, in a restriction imposed under completely different circumstances more than a century ago, is admitted by British officers of repute. But the disability affects not merely the situ ation with which Great Britain might be confronted in the course of a great war; it has a most unfavourable influence on the sentimental attachment of the Native Army and on the popularity of recruitment thereto. The English public is liable to forget how great is the importance of the Indian troops in the whole scheme of Imperial defence; and that they must be treated not as a mere horde of mercenaries, but as a National Army upholding the honour and dignity of their Motherland.
That all real command of these 160,000 Indian troops- to say nothing of some 36,000 reservists and certain special forces should be committed to English officers, and that the latest joined subaltern from Sandhurst should rank before war-worn Indian officers, constitute a racial disability that cannot be con ducive to the zeal and contentment of the native soldiery, and will in time, I fear, undermine the self-respect of the Indian soldier and his moral efficiency and perhaps his loyalty. To a much greater degree than is commonly recognised in Great Britain, the Indian people are led and influenced by their countrymen of high birth and good position; and so far from this absolute racial bar serving as a safeguard, its maintenance is a source of weakness, and must if persisted in, become a source of actual peril. I am convinced that the safety of British rule in India will be greatly increased by substantial and carefully devised measures for extending to the Indian aristocracy in the sphere of Army organisation the confidence and trust shown in the people of the country, and more particularly in the professional classes in the sphere of civil and judicial administration. There are scores of young noblemen lacking definite purpose in life, only too eager to place their inherited military instincts at the service of their King-Emperor, but who are debarred from doing so by the existing archaic limitations. It may be hoped that Lord Hardinge, whose Viceroyalty has begun under most favourable omens, will not only maintain the new spirit of which I have spoken, in the general sphere of administration, but will promote its extension to the Army.
No reference to this new spirit as the animating glory of Lord Minto’s tenure would be complete without allusion to Lady Minto’s active and whole-hearted co-operation with him in its promotion. Not only has she maintained the tradition of deep practical interest in works of charity and mercy exhibited by her predecessors, but from the Indian point of view she has human ised Viceregal Lodge, Simla and Government House, Calcutta.
From the now distant days of Lady Frere, Government House, Bombay, and also the Governor’s residence at Poona, have been open to European and Asiatic alike, on terms of social equality.
But in Upper India, unfortunately, this had not been the case till Lady Minto became Vicereine. The example she set so quietly and tactfully in humanising the homes of which she has been for five years the chateleine has inevitably been followed at other centres, and thus a further and very important breach has been made in traditions which have served their day, but cannot be defended now that Indian political and social consciousness has been awakened. In every respect Lady Minto proved the right helpmate for the high-minded nobleman whose departure from India is deeply regretted; and like him she will live in the memory and admiration of a grateful people.
Source: National Review, London,January 1911, pp. 852-60. The National Review was a conservative journal of some influence.
On Lord Minto see Mary, Countess ofMinto, India: Minto and Morley, !905-10, London, 1934; John Buchan, Lord Minto: A Memoir, London, 1924; S. R. Wasti, Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-10, Oxford, 1964; Stanley A. Wolpert, Morley and India, 1906-1910, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967; Martin Gilbert, Servant of India: A Study of Imperial Rule from 1905-1910 as Told Through the Correspondence of SirJ ames Dunlop Smith, Private Secretary to the Viceroy, London, 1966; M. N. Das, India under Morley and Minto, London, 1964; “Lord Minto’s Viceroyalty”, Edinburgh Review, October 1910; Asiaticus, “India: Lord Minto’s Viceroyalty”, National Review, November 1910; and H. H. Dodwell, “Lord Minto as Viceroy”, National Review, April 1925.