Date: 13 February 1913
Location: Bombay
Speaker: Aga Khan III
Source: Speeches of Aga Khan III – K K Aziz
Full Text
India’s Muslims disturbed by recent events in Muslim lands – how Muslims of Turkey might be helped – alleviate the suffering of those rendered homeless – let the Sultan and his Ministers solve the question of war and peace – a loan for Turkey – Turkey in Asia should be a strong power- England’s absorption of Arabia and Mesopotamia a dangerous proposition – help to strengthen friend ship between Britain and Turkey – ideal of self-government for India- duties of Muslims in India.
Ever since the outbreak of the Balkan War, coming as it did shortly after the Tripoli War, the practical absorption of Morocco by France, and the possibility that Persia might be gradually brought under European protection, the position and the senti ments of the Moslems of India have, with ever increasing rapidity, become extraordinarily difficult, sad and unfortunate. On the one hand they realise that their most cherished hope for the per manence of the chief Moslem State and the independence of the two remaining Mussalman States is disappearing; and on the other hand daily they read and hear, and of course they must more or less realise from their own reading of the history of past wars, the terrible happenings in European Turkey. Under these circumstances every Mussalman is not only depressed and sad, but he is anxious, most anxious, to do something to aid his co religionists. Yet this desire often carries him into an attitude of useless negation- an attitude of mere dislike of the European, suspicion of the Christians, and still inability to put the responsi bility for his own misfortune on anybody else. This attitude can be gleaned by anyone who takes note not only of the private conversation of individual Mussulmans of all classes, but who reads between the lines of the various resolutions which have been passed, as well as by the general atmosphere of Moslem gatherings.
Now I may claim that I have studied the Turkish question and the general position of the Mussulman for many years past carefully. I can also say that hardly an important sentence has been written in any of the leading European papers about the war that I have not read, in addition to numberless reports from the charitable organisations at the Front, from the Consuls, and from various Red Crescent doctors and others. Under _these cir cumstances I feel it my duty to offer a few suggestions and ideas as to how the situation strikes one who can claim at least this much – that he has no other motive except the welfare of Islam.
The point that at once strikes us, the immediate question, is, What can we do to help the Mussulmans of Turkey? First we must regard the situation from the point of view of the happiness of the Turks, so as to prevent as far as possible suffering and pain amongst the hundreds of thousands who have been rendered homeless and helpless by the war. This great task is the first and foremost duty of every Mussulman. Secondly, What can’ be done to make Turkey, as reconstituted by the war, a powerful Asiatic State? The two questions, although interlaced, are in a way really distinct. The first is an immediate question; the second is one for the future. So strongly have I been convinced that our whole efforts should be concentrated on the prompt and effective relief of suffering in Turkey that, while I have been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the University Movement, I felt it to be my duty entirely to leave that question in other and abler hands amongst the Mussulmans of India, and to devote all my thoughts and the time that I would give to public service to the relief of the sufferers by the war. For the condition of society induced by the war resembles a great famine, though it is infi nitely worse. It is a question of life and death. Everything else in life can wait, but when life itself is face to face with hunger and want, there is nothing but immediate relief or death. It would indeed be a terrible thing for the Mussulmans of India, if, through any want of effort on their part, thousands of their brethren in Turkey died. On this point no Mussulman can have any doubt or hesitation: his duty is clear. He must send money as much as he can – for the relief of the suffering and the wounded; and what is equally important, for the thousands of refugees who are now flocking into Asia Minor from European Turkey and from Macedonia. These refugees want not only food but money to buy seed for the coming season, so as to give them a chance to re-establish themselves in Asia Minor. These are questions of humanity which are urgent and immediate. We can establish a school or a University twelve months hence: we cannot bring to life those who die to-day. Just as when a famine is raging in an Indian district it would be idle to concentrate on some philanthropic work of future utility in preference to the saving of lives, so our immediate efforts must be concentrated on the saving of life. May the Mussulmans of India have the grace to realise this immediate need!
But whilst bending every effort to the relief of distress, surely it is equally incumbent upon us to eschew any policy which may increase and prolong, unnecessarily and uselessly, the sufferings of our co-religionists in Turkey! The Sultan and his Ministers alone can judge of the wisdom of prolonging or terminating the war. They alone are in possession of the facts: they alone can accurately balance the obvious disadvantages of continuing the war with the possible advantages of concluding peace. It does seem to me a cruel addition to the burdens which Turkish stat esmen have to bear, at this crisis in the affairs of their country, to be harassed by irresponsible advice from Indian Mussulmans who know nothing of the grim realities of the position; and upon whom none of the grievous burdens of the war actually fall. How easy it is to bid others fight for the honour of Islam when here we enjoy the serene comfort of peace and prosperity: how hard it must be for Turkish statesmen to decide, well knowing the consequences of their action, yet driven forward by the tele graphic appeals of Moslems abroad! His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is bidden do this, or refrain from doing that or the honour of Islam is sold; what right have we to assume that the Padishah is one whit less sensitive on the point of Moslem honour than the Moslems of Lucknow or Lahore, of Madras or Bombay? But he and his Ministers have both the knowledge and the responsi bility, which none of us here share: their ears are dinned by the cries of the wounded and the wails of the fatherless. As on them lies sole responsibility, with them lies sole discretion unfettered by irresponsible appeals from abroad. Tolstoy and Gladstone both suggested that it would be a good thing for the cause of peace if before a war broke out all the leading journalists were sent to the Front-there would be less Yellow Jour!_lalism hankering after war. Well, it would be a good thing if all these hundreds of thousands who are, from here, giving their advice, were forced to make all the sacrifices that the war entails on the people of Turkey themselves. There would be more calm and deliberate advice given. Our watchword is work and sacrifice: let that suffice.
Now we come to the second point, namely what can the Mussul mans of India do for the re-organisation of Turkey,.·· as a great and independent power, after the present war is over. First of all Turkey requires, and must require, a large loan and nothing would show the sincerity of the Mussulmans of India in the interests of Turkey more than the advancement of four or five million pounds to Turkey. But let us at least be practical. The Mussulmans of India are not rich enough and are not in the position to spare the money. Every penny that Turkey receives she must receive in a way that will assure her life in the future.
I am afraid the suggestion of a loan made by the Orient Bank in the form it is advanced is neither feasible nor practicable.
Loans without interest are out of the question. If, on account of religious sentiment, no interest is to be touched, there should be a condition by which a loan of 100 would be issued at 75 and repaid at par after five years. The Orient Bank and the other Mussulmans who wish to carry out this scheme should proceed on these lines: Turkey should borrow for five years either at five per cent issued at par or at 75 repayable at 100. These bonds should be sent by Turkey to India; and the various banks here, including the Orient Bank, might sell as brokers only, not as borrowers, while the security would be that of the Turkish Government and not that of the Bank, except of course in the interval between the receipt of the deposit and the delivery of the bonds to the purchasers, which would be very short. The banks naturally would charge their own commission. It is advis able that the loan should be so arranged that even half-sovereign bonds could be issued. Such a loan could be safely subscribed to and safely taken up by the Mussulmans of India and while undoubtedly it would mean sacrifice, for if the same capital were embarked in trade, a greater return would be secured, yet the sacrifice would not be of such a nature as to ruin the millions of India without doing very much for Turkey. The credit of Turkey, especially if peace is soon concluded, is sufficient and there is no danger whatever as to the repayment of the capital in five years.
But now comes a still more important question namely, What is to be the position of Turkey after peace? Whatever happens, whatever the result of the last stages of this war, Turkey must in the future be an Asiatic Power; she must concentrate on Asia.
Then comes the greatest of her problems, a problem of life and death to her – whether any Mussulman State is to remain or not.
Turkey as an Asiatic Power can live and thrive only if she has the goodwill, friendship and the support of England. England is the only country which has everything to gain and nothing to lose by a strong Turkey in Asia. As it is, the route to India has practically fallen all along the Mediterranean into the hands of foreign Powers, and should Asiatic Turkey, Syria, Mesopotamia and Anatolia become German, French, and Russian, it would indeed be a most serious position for England. Apart from any question of sentiment it is to the interests of England that Turkey in Asia should become strong and prosperous.
I have often heard it suggested that England should herself absorb Arabia and Southern Mesopotamia, but the dangers of such an exposed position, the want of the millions of soldiers to defend it and the hundred and one other difficulties, are so great that it would impose an excessive tax even on the resources of the British Empire. Now here is a great opening for the Mussulmans of India, alike of serving England and Islam. Let them use all their influence – through their loyal efforts, through their goodwill – to bring England and Turkey together and, in fact, to carry out in Asiatic Turkey the spirit of the Cyprus Conven tion and the policy of Lord Beaconsfield . . . At last there is a possibility that the dream of many Mussulmans may come true, and that England and Turkey may become fast and firm friends.
But this means an equally important responsibility for the Mussul mans of India. It means that they must say nothing, do nothing, and act in no way that can weaken English confidence in Islam and in the loyalty of the Mussulmans of India. If England is to become the bulwark of Islam, then Islam also must ever be ready to play its part loyally in the welfare and strengthening and defence of the British Empire.
Far be it from me to suggest that the role of Islam in India is to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. We could do Britain and the British people no greater injustice to say that Mussulmans care nothing for the ideal of self-government, within the Empire and under the Crown and Flag. To entertain that ideal is to show that Mussulmans appreciate the British spirit, and desire to pay it the most subtle of flatteries – imitation. But this is an ideal which can be reached only by generations of effort, by gener ations of self-sacrifice, and any step to preCipitate the end by artificial means even by a generation or two would be to do England the greatest of all injustices – it would force the British people to confuse the only loyalty that is worth having, namely the loyalty of high-minded, self-respecting subjects, working fo; the ideals that have been attained in England, with the madness and crime of disloyalty. The stronger our commonsense the more sincere will be our recognition of the fact that the Government of India cannot change its character until new generations, with changed characters and with changed local surroundings and customs, have arisen, alike among Hindus and Mussulmans.
Surely if we look the facts of the situation resolutely in the face, the duty of Indian Moslems in these anxious days is clear.
It is first to bend all our energies to the work whic_h cannot wait, the relief of suffering, the care of the wounded, and the rehabilitation of the peasantry who have fled from Macedonia and Thrace to Asia Minor. For this money, and yet more money, is the crying need, not the bemusement of Turkish statesmen, terribly weighted by their responsibilities, by demands for vicarious sacrifices. Then when the war is over, efforts no less sustained will be demanded to help Turkey on her path as a great Asiatic Power. That path will not be easy: covetous. eyes are cast toward the territories which must be the home and the strength of the future Turkish Empire. One Power, and one Power only can give Turkey disinterested advice and help in this great work, and that is England. She has no territorial ambitions in Asia Minor or Syria or Arabia or Mesopotamia; all her interests lie in the recreation of a strong and powerful Turkey based on these regions, in order to prevent rivals from being established on the flank of the road to India. What an opportunity lies before the Moslems of India here! By our present sacrifices we can establish an influence with the Turkish Government which will give weight to our sentiments and representations at Constantin ople. In this way, we can act as the cement which will unite these two Empires into an irresistible whole, preserving at once to Turkey the opportunity of working out her destiny in Asia, safe guarding the road to India, and returning to the days of the Great Eltchi and Beaconsfield. If that be the outcome of this unhappy war, then we shall find full compensation for the loss of Tripoli and Macedonia in the assured future of a great Turkey in Asia, firmly united with England, and thus both securing her own destiny and averting from the Empire the danger of either a fresh menace or of fresh responsibilities at the very gates of India.
Source: The Times of India, Bombay, 14 February 1913.
A very brief summary of the article was carried by The Times, London, on the same date, prefaced by the following words of its Bombay correspondent: “There has recently been an unfortunate development among certain sec tions of Indian Moslems in their attitude towards the war. Inexcusably extravagant language has been employed at some public meetings – notably at Lucknow and Madras – and there has been a manifest tendency to develop strong anti-British feeling. At this juncture His Highness the Aga Khan has made a notable pronouncement on the situation.”
On the Balkan War see Siddha Mohana Mitra, Anglp-Indian Studies, London, 1913, pp. 490-504; G. Ward Price, ExtrarSpecial Correspondent, London, 1957; Asiaticus, “India: Indian Muhammadans and the Balkan War”, National Review, March 1913, pp. 179-88; Diplomatist, “Turkey and the Balkan States”, Empire Review, September 1913, pp. 82-98; Geoffrey Drage, “The Balkan Main Current”, EdinburghReview,January 1913, pp. 197-216; ShahMuhammad Naim atullah, “Recent Turkish Events and Muslim India”, Asiatic Quarterly Review, October 1913, pp. 241-8; Austen Verney, “New Aspects of the Eastern Ques tion”, East and West, May 1913, pp. 422-30; Homersham Cox, “Turks and Christians”, Modem World, January 1914, pp. 15-18; Arthur W. Spencer, “The Balkan Question: The Key to a Permanent Peace”, ibid., April1914, pp. 162-74; “The Balkan War and the Balance of Power”, Round Table, June 1913, pp. 395-424; “The Doctrine of Ascendancy”, ibid., December 1914, pp. 70-102; Cyril Falls, “The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913”, History Today, September 1963, pp. 605-13, Lakshmi Kant Choudhary, “The Balkan Wars (1912-13) and Indian Nationalism”, Political Scientist, January-June 1966, pp. 59-65; and the following items in Muslim India and Islamic Review (London): “Foreign Policy and the Muslims”, March 1913, pp. 46–7; Khwaja Kamaluddin, “An Open Letter to the Prime Minister”, May 1913, pp. 126–9,June 1913, pp. 164-7 andJuly 1913, pp. 219-21; Zafar Ali Khan, “The Struggle in the Near East and the Muslim Feeling in India: An Appeal to the British Public”, February 1913, pp. 28-32; andAl-Quidwai (Mushir Husain Kidwai), “The Powers and Turkey”, May 1914, pp. 168-71.
All India Muslim Conference, Delhi. His Highness the Aga Khan as President with other Muslim leaders, 1902.
His Highness the Aga Khan at the time of the Convocation at Aligarh University when he received an honorary degree. Quaid-e-Millat, Liaquat Ali Khan, is seen to the right of the Aga Khan.
Postage •tarnps issued to Inark the Birth C entenary-of Aga Kb.an III.
.. ~~/ A keen golfer, the Aga Khan was a familiar figure on the golf courses when he visited England. (POPPERFOTO)
Aga Khan III: A portrait.
-:t . ,’.!’ His Highness the Aga Khan presiding at a meeting in Bombay held to protest against the treatment of Indians in South Africa.
The Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad AliJinnah and many other leaders attended this meeting.
The Round Table Conference. The Aga Khan led the Muslim Delegation.
Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah is to the left of the Aga Khan, 1931
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His Highness Aga Khan III. (CAMERA PRESS)