Date: 10 February 1912
Location: Not specified
Speaker: Aga Khan III
Source: Speeches of Aga Khan III – K K Aziz
Full Text
The recent changes will affect Islam’s destiny in India – Muslims will not lose a~ a result of the changes – possible results of the transfer of capital to Delhi – the implications of the partition for the numerical strength of Muslims in Eastern Bengal and Assam their over-riding need is education- Lord Hardinge’s promise of a university at Dacca – ultimate gains and losses of the partition advice to the Muslims to welcome the changes.
The recent changes came so suddenly that it is not strange that the Mussulman public should have hesitated in deciding how it should receive them. That they will have considerable effect on Islam’s future destiny in India is an evident truism. Yet I doubt if there be a single individual, outside the small circle of the authors of these changes, who has not passed through different emotions since he heard the royal announcement.
I, for one, however, after a careful consideration of every aspect of the question, have come to the conclusion that the Mussul mans do not lose anything of consequence, while India as a whole and the Empire will gain considerably. The gain of India must be the gain of the Mussulmans of India, provided no direct Moslem interest is attacked. We must take the changes seriatim, look at their probable results, and determine how India, and then the Mussulmans of India, will be benefited, or otherwise, by each. The change of capital in itself will have the great advan tage for Mussulmans of bringing the Government of India nearer to the centres of Moslem intellectual activity and to the most virile portions of the Moslem community in India. It will, in the next place, bring the Viceroy nearer to the Moslem University, an institution in the welfare of which as the Chancellor of the University he is directly interested. For India as a whole it will be a great gain that the seat of Government should be, so to speak, in a neutral central position, and removed from any great section of people or province that may have interests of its own not identical with or always friendly to those of other equally great and important sections of people or provinces. For Calcutta, with its great commerce, and tapping as it does the richest ‘Hinter land’ of Southern Asia, it cannot be anything more than the loss of the social attractions of [a] Government House.
Then comes the undoing of the Partition. No doubt the Mus sulmans were in a distinct majority in the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, and this unique position is now lost. But looking at the position of Islam in India as a whole, I doubt if it will be found that it was a good thing to be in a clear majority in one province and a minority in almost every other. The disad vantages of such a situation are obvious. Islam in India is one and indivisible. It is the duty of a Moslem to look not only to the immediate interests of his own locality but to those of his co religionists as a whole. But if we look upon it from a still wider point of view as Indians, we shall find that the old Partition had deeply wounded, and not unnaturally, the sentiments of the great Bengali-speaking millions of India. Anything that permanently alienates and offends the sentiments or interests of millions of Indians, be they Moslem or Hindu, is undoubtedly in itself an undesirable thing and should not only be avoided by the Govern ment but also opposed by all communities of India. Viewed in this light, the undoing of the Partition which has satisfied the great Bengali-speaking people ought to be in itself a cause of congratulation for all Indians, whether Hindus or Mussulmans, and I think we should all be deeply grateful to His Excellency Lord Hardinge [the Viceroy] for this great act of statesmanship which has removed a grievance from one important section of His Majesty’s Indian subjects. From the point of view of the greater good of India and the Empire, the removal of the capital and the undoing of the Partition, or, rather, the creation of two new provinces, have been masterstrokes of statesmanship.
But there still remains the question of the r~al needs of the Mussulmans of Eastern Bengal and Assam. These needs can all be summed up in one word- ‘education’. However, since Lord Hardinge’s Government has promised a University for Dacca- a University that we most sincerely hope will be a teaching and residential one – I doubt if there is left unredressed any real grievance of the Mussulmans of Eastern Bengal, provided, of course, that the new Government of Bengal sees to it that the recommendations of the Education Commission of 1882 are carried out both in the spirit and the letter. For with facilities for education provided in the province, the Mussulmans can raise themselves to a position in which it will be impossible for anyone to deprive them of what is rightly their due. Some have no doubt asserted that the new University will perhaps compete with the great Moslem University at Aligarh. Nothing could be more absurd. For the great Moslem University is to be a central residen tial institution for the elite of the community, while the other is to help forward all those who might be left behind in the race of life by the supersession of Dacca by Calcutta. Cotnpetition between two such different institutions would be as absurd as a race between a bird and a fish. Calcutta and India as a whole will also gain educationally, for no university can be really efficient that has to cater for a population of over 100 millions and rush through more than 8,000 examinations. It must necessarily become mechanical.
So resuming the facts, we can put the gains as a neutral and central capital, the satisfaction of the sentimental grievance of the great Bengali nation, and the protection of the onJy real interest of the Moslems of Eastern Bengal.· The loss comes to be limited to the loss of the social importance of Calcutta, but neither the loss of its trade nor of its prosperity.
Under these circumstances, I feel it my undoubted duty to advise my co-religionists to welcome the changes and be grateful to the Government that has initiated them. The need for this is all the greater since the Mussulmans will thus show their real and sincere sympathy with their Hindu brethren of Bengal and their readiness to respect Hindu and Bengali sentiment. Are n·ot the feelings animating the promoters of the Hindu and Moslem University schemes those of fraternal and healthy rivalry? And above all, by working for the success of these great changes loyally, wholeheartedly and without any arriere pensees, Moslems will best prove their loyal devotion to their gracious and beloved Sovereign, the King-Emperor, and their loyal appreciation of the sympathetic Government of Lord Hardinge that has removed the great sentimental grievance of the Bengalis and has yet pro tected, by promising a University at Dacca, all the real interests of the Moslems of Eastern Bengal.
Source: Comrade, 10 February 1912.
The date on which the Aga Khan issued this statement is not confirmed. I have been unable to discover the origins of this statement. Was it issued to the press, from where Comrade picked it up and reprinted it, or sent specially to Muhammad Ali’s journal? In any case, the writing of it may safely be attributed to the week preceding its appearance in Comrade. The partition was undone in December 1911 at the Royal Durbar held in Delhi.
This issue of Comrade also carried a long, very critical comment on the Aga Khan’s views. Both the statement and the editorial attack are relevant to the later clash between Muhammad Ali and the Aga Khan.
As far as I know this is the only public pronouncement of the Aga Khan which ran counter to majority opinion in Muslim India. The partition of Bengal in 1905 and its repeal in 1911 should be briefly described here.
Writing to Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, in April 1902, on the subject of Berar being put under the administration of the Central Provinces, Curzon had, in passing, mentioned his intention of examining in general the question of provincial boundaries. On Bengal he was definite that it was “unquestionably too large a charge for any single man”.
No sooner had his intention to change the boundaries of Bengal been made public than there was an immediate outcry against it. Undeterred by this opposition, which he considered ill-founded and not disinterested, he decided to visit the scene of the trouble itself. Informing his wife of his plan to leave for Chittagong on 13 February 1904, he wrote, “The row about the dismember ment of Eastern Bengal continues in every accent of agony and denunciation.
But so far no argument.” His trip to Chittagong, Mymensingh and Dacca convinced him of the case for a change. His chief argument was that Bengal was too unwieldy to be administered properly and conscientiously by one lieutenant-governor. Many among those who bitterly opposed his plan agreed with him in the diagnosis, but prescribed a different remedy. They wanted a governor with an executive council to replace the lieutenant-governor. To one who had for long urged the reduction of Madras and Bombay to the status of other provinces, such a scheme of adding to the number of presidencies was obviously unacceptable.
The scheme Curzon had produced earlier, in December 1903, had proposed the reduction of the population of Bengal from 78,500,000 to 60,000,000. The amended scheme, which he sent to the India Office in February 1905, further reduced the population of Bengal to 54,000,000, of whom 9,000,000 would be Muslims and 42,000,000 Hindus. It handed over to Assam a population which would bring the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam up to 31,000,000, of whom 18,000,000 would be Muslims and 12,000,000 Hindus. Bengal would consist of 141,580 square miles and Assam of 106,540 square miles. This scheme was sanctioned by StJohn Brodrick, the Secretary of State for India, in June 1905. The proclamation of the formation of the new province was made in September, and the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam came formally into being on 16 October 1905.
Later events were to show that the Viceroy had misread the temper of the people in his tour of Bengal. He had returned with a firm faith in the righteousness of his resolve and a sincere hope that the reform would be welcome to the people. What actually happened was the exact reverse. He had claimed that his speeches had silenced his critics and his plan had captivated the imagination of the people. In effect, his project started a passionate and sweeping agitation against the partition that was to prove a headache to the British Government, a subject of party politics for the British Parliament, an excellent weapon for the detractors of Curzon, a milestone in the history of modern India and, above all, the beginning of Muslim separatism in Indian politics.
How far was Curzon responsible for these results? He was contemptuously indifferent to the agitation aroused by his scheme. But this attitude cannot be explained by the autocratic character of the Viceroy or by the supreme confi dence he had in his administrative genius. In spite of his domineering air he was by no means indifferent to Indian public opinion. On ID;any occasions, when the interests of Great Britain were in conflict with those of India, he had unhesitatingly championed the latter and unmistakably emphasized the importance of the growth of Indian public opinion and the folly of ignoring it. In fact, so consistently and outspokenly did he adopt this attitude that it evoked a respectful protest from Sir Arthur Godley, who could not understand “why what is called public opinion in India should have any more overwhelming weight with Your Excellency’s Government or with the Secretary of State than it had ten or fifteen years ago”.
Why did a man with such a deep and honest respect for Indian public opinion persist in the execution of his project after he had seen how distasteful it was to the people? His official biographer has one explanation. Curzon was convinced in his mind that his scheme was in the interest of India. He felt that the masses were suffering untold hardships by the existence and retention of old boundaries, mostly drawn as a result of accidents of history, results of battles and whims of kings, and never for reasons of administrative expediency. By doing away with such harmful anachronisms he was, he thought, bringing justice to India. An agitation based on sentiment was not to be permitted to stand in the way of such a noble act. “The fact of the matter is that Lord Curzon reserved to himself the right to decide when public opinion was an expression of views based on sober reasoning and supported by obvious justice and when it was a mere frothy ebullition of irrational sentiment.”
A more practical explanation is that Curzon was right when he had found his audience not hostile during his fact-finding visit to East Bengal. Muslims formed a majority of the population of that area, and they naturally welcomed the project of a new province in which they would be the ruling nationality.
Thus he was neither factually incorrect nor foolishly optimistic in reporting to Lady Curzon in glowing terms. This is corroborated by later events: the agitation was centred in Calcutta, not in Dacca, and it was more dangerous and wide spread in West Bengal than in the new province.
Curzon was the most brilliant proconsul England ever sent out in her long career of empire making. He did many good things in India, and such vital spheres of public policy as education, agriculture, land policy, irrigation, railway administration and ancient monuments, still bear the stamp of his ability and foresight. Such ruthless pursuit of administrative perfection has its own penal ties. Men, particularly men ruled by an alien race, forget the benefits bestowed upon them with a generous hand, and remember the tiny slips, the small defects and the passing hardships. Curzon had displeased the Hindus by refusing to recognize the Indian National Congress officially. He had also annoyed the Bengali Hindus by his reforms in the administration of the Calcutta university.
When he modified the boundaries of Bengal, his erstwhile enemies were pro vided with a clear-cut issue on which they could attack the Viceroy. The so called partition of Bengal was thus made a pretext for giving vent to all the bitterness and hatred the Hindus had been nourishing for so long.
As far as is known, the Englishman of Calcutta was the first to suggest that the King should visit India and there be crowned Emperor. It was hoped that this visit would appeal to the Indians, who regarded the sovereign as a deity, and that it would destroy the seeds of discontent. Gradually this suggestion matured, and then the question of boons that His Majesty should declare in India arose.
Various suggestions were made. Some thought that it would be a good gesture to admit Indian officers to commissions in British regiments; others prescribed emptying debtors’ prisons. The Viceroy proposed two separate major boons: the reversal of Curzon’s partition of Bengal and the transference of the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. This was enthusiastically commended by Keir Hardie.
Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded Minto as Viceroy in November 1910, discovered that the partition was severely criticized on all sides yet, in the beginning, he held out no hope of its reversal, though even then Bengalis repeatedly expressed the hope that the King would repeal the measure. In January 1911, however, he received a proposal from Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State, suggesting the possibility of a modification of the partition. Crewe’s idea was to create a gover’norship instead of a lieutenant-governorship, with the capital at Dacca or elsewhere; to form an enclave of Calcutta directly under the Viceroy; and to appoint Commissioners in various divisions of the province.
The King was to announce these changes at the Durbar as he was ‘strongly in favour of it in principle’. Hardinge consulted his officials and advisers, but all strongly objected to the scheme; and thereupon Crewe let the plan drop.
During later months, however, Hardinge became convinced that if partition were allowed to stand very serious trouble would follow. His views became a definite policy after he had received a memorandum from the Home Member of his council, Sir John Jenkins, on 17 June 1911, which urgently argued for the transfer of the capital to Delhi and the reversal of partition, both changes to be announced by the King. Hardinge quickly agreed and drew up a very secret memorandum which was then submitted to his council. No vital objec tions were raised by the council, and on 19 July the Viceroy wrote a long letter to Crewe containing full details of this policy and a strong plea for its accept ance. Crewe wired back on 7 August giving his full support, and authority to proceed, and urged absolute secrecy till the Durbar. The King was told of this scheme by Crewe himself in the presence of Sir A. J. Bigge. His Majesty accepted it with great keenness. He was very anxious to make the announcement in person and insisted on the need for complete secrecy. Morley and Asquith were told later, and both were deeply impressed with the idea.
In his letter to the Secretary of State, Hardinge expressed his conviction that partition was causing deep resentment among the Bengalis, though he con fessed that Eastern Bengal had benefited greatly by the partition and that its Muslims were loyal and contented. One of the arguments he gave in favour of his proposal was that a reversal would bring Hindus and Muslims closer together.
Crewe, in his reply, hoped that Muslims would regard with satisfaction the re erection of Delhi as capital of India, yet emphasized the need to balance the different communities in the new set-up. In his boundless enthusiasm for the new plan he wrote, “I cannot recall in history, nor can I picture in any portion of the civilized world as it now exists, a series of administrative changes of so wide scope culminating in the transfer of the main seat of Government, carried out as I believe the future will prove, with so little detriment to any class of the community, while satisfying the historical sense of millions.”
The Coronation Durbar was duly held on 12 December amid brilliant page antry. The King announced the proposed changes, and said at the end, “It is Our earnest desire that these changes may conduce to the better administration of India and the greater prosperity and happiness of Our. beloved People.”
Muslim reaction to the reversal of partition was instantaneous, bitter and furious. It confirmed their belief that the Government listened only to clamour and agitation, and a bitter jest, “no bombs, no boons”, was passed round among them at Delhi.