Date: February 1907
Location: London
Speaker: Aga Khan III
Source: Speeches of Aga Khan III – K K Aziz
Full Text
The concept of “the changeless East” is misleading – “practical” discontent in India – reflected in the Indian press – vernacular press and the feelings of the masses – causes of the unrest influence of external factors – the importance of internal factors – the theory that British rule has impoverished India not valid nor the official view that efficient administration and increased wealth will prevent discontent – other theories: lack of sympathy among British administrators; absence of social intercourse between brown and white; and the perception of the British as conquerors – Muslims desire a special system of representation and a university at Aligarh – force alone is not enough to assure British supremacy – changes in the offing: Berlin-Baghdad railway; the Russian railway; the awakening of China – Britain should win the affection of her Indian subjects- advantages of such a policy – dangers of giving power to some individuals and communities ordinary Indians desire to come up to the level of the white people – the importance of social reforms – the role played by the Sover eign in Britain in social uplift – the proposal for a non-political Regency in India and its advantages – this step should be above party politics. “There is no idea more misleading than that embodied in the phrase ‘the changeless East’. Age-worn Asia is no more exempt from the laws of change than the rest of the world.” These wise words of the Indian correspondent of the National Review should be taken to heart by all who wish to understand the difficult problems connected with India, and, above all, that problem of problems which is perhaps the most difficult of all connected with the great dependency- the relations of the brown and white races.
It would enormously simplify the task of ruling India, not only justify, but with the contentment of the people, if .Englishmen in general, and the individual who is the final arbiter of the destinies of the British Empire, viz., “the man in the street,” in particular, took to heart and ever remembered some other words of the same correspondent. “Lord Curzon truly said, on the eve of the day on which he laid down the crushing burden of the office of Viceroy, that the one great fault of Englishmen in India is that we don’t look sufficiently ahead. If we did, we should foresee that our patriarchal conception of our rule must ultimately be slowly modified in various respects. It is not enough to say that the ryat at the plough typifies India – that truism has too often led policy astray.”
It is the odd 20 per cent. (one must bear in mind that this odd 20 per cent. reaches a total over 50 millions of men) of alert, receptive, but often ill-balanced minds who have to be also con sidered.
I venture to say that before approaching the study, of Indian problems-provided that we wish to arrive at conclusions intellec tually just, and not merely cause the verbal overthrow of views repulsive to us personally – we should bear in mind the words of the correspondent already quoted, and abandon once for all the method of deducing political actions from abstract principles, and accept frankly the sound method of induction. Then, and only then, will we find results other than the bitter fruit of discontent. We must cross-question history, not merely put leading questions to periods useful to our foregone conclusions.
If, with such principles as our guides, we approach the present position of political affairs in India, and the general relations of the brown to the white race, what do we find?
A sentimental loyalty to the Crown and the Flag, and a practical discontent – a discontent that though not disloyal has yet in it the germs of danger. I know that this will be denied, that I shall be told that my assertions do not prove the fact, and that my observations have been limited and faulty. We will, however, appeal to life, and we will go direct to its manifestations. I suppose it will be accepted that general experience goes to prove that the opinions of a people, especially if they are without representative institutions and government, are in the long run reflected by its Press. But even here we must follow the inductive method. It is quite conceivable that in a country of comparatively small size certain small corporations may make a “corner” of the news papers, and air opinions that belong to a class by buying or commercially boycotting the journals of their opponents, and in this way represent for years views of a minority as those of the mass of the people. But has this been the case in India? Far from it; the Indian vernacular Press is owned by numberless proprietors, and not by any means entirely by Bengalese or Brah mins, as some would have us assume! Almost all are full of discontent, though in varying degrees. Had they bought out those that were ostentatiously started to end their mischief, we might then allow it to be assumed that the power of capital had silenced the voice of the millions. But such “loyal” papers do exist, only they are without healthy circulation, and nobody takes them at all seriously. Their general popularity ceases to exist the moment they become “loyal”, and then they become the well-nursed but sickly children of some generous millionaire, prince, or small corporation. They know not the joys of good health enjoyed by their hardy cousins of the disaffected camp. If we leave the Press and go to the man for observation the results are similar. The difficulties are infinitely greater. To begin with, no individual can observe 300 millions of his fellow creatures; but even then if any one makes it his business to mix with the poorer classes and listens to them patiently he will come to the conclusion that most of what one reads in the vernacular Press is thought of and talked about by the public. Of course, here we must take the opinion of the observer on trust. However, such are my own conclusions, drawn from observations in Bengal, the Bombay Presidency, and the Punjab, and I venture to prophesy that if a few independent Englishmen would come out and give to India for five or six years (one in each province) the same amount of thought and patient observation, that Mr. Bodley gave to France, they would come to conclusions similar to mine -viz., that the vernacular Press does represent the feelings of the masses. Of course, we have all often heard the assertions about the dumb millions not having any sympathy with the Press, and the discontent being in no way that of the masses. We must examine this assertion with care and patience. It is comforting, but is it like the opium-eater’s paradise – an unwholesome dream, destined to end in a dreary headache, or is it like the North Sea breeze, an exhilarating reality?
To begin with, if these millions are dumb, how on earth did any one come to know that they were contented and happy?
Dumbness does not mean the silent ecstasy of supreme joy; it means the inability of intelligible articulation. If, 4owever, we look into the question more thoroughly, and reason from obser vations of actions, the only form of reasoning open to us, since “dumbness” prevents questioning, we shall soon find that these very dumb people are the backbone of the disaffected. To begin with, human nature being what it is, and the influences of child hood and early associations being so very powerful, surely if the dumb millions had such a wonderful amount of contentment a fair proportion of their numbers that had learnt the secret of speech would show some of their original preferences? Now we will turn to the reality. Almost all the most disaffected and discontented come from families and classes that are or have been “dumb”. Amongst the articulate who come from the “talking” classes – the merchant, the lawyer, or the city broker one often finds individuals who are satisfied. But when the early associates have been “dumb” the result is invariably extreme disaffection. A little observation of men will prove this. Surely if discontent was only the speciality of the articulate classes the result would have been the other way round? We will not discuss this point further. We will accept the evidence of the·. Press and of almost all non-official observers – English, foreign, or Indian.
As for the insignificant, but noisy race of Indian optimists, gener ally well-born gentlemen, who are to be found in India in the anterooms of Government Houses and Residencies, who are ready to assure us that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, we will only hope that our rulers will remember that to indulge often in the sweet words of such men is as dangerous to clear views and thought as the contrast use of poisonous aperitifs to digestion.
I will now examine the causes usually asserted as the causes of discontent, and the remedies generally suggested, hoping that by the dispassionate examination of every suggested cause and remedy we may not only diagnose the disease rightly, but find a curative specific. Some loyal Indians hastily assert that the pre vailing ferment is the result of Lord Curzon’s seven years of active and energetic administration. They also are ready to assert that until Lord Curzon came out the average Indian did not think much about the government of India, and that the mass of the people had not been taught to think about any political ruler above the collector of his district, and that Lord Curzqn so impressed the native mind with the importance of the govern ment of India to his own well-being, and so drew attention to the fact that the government of India was – as far as internal affairs went – an autocratic despotism, that the Indian began to inquire for himself, and wonder why one man, the occupant of a distant palace, and not of his race or blood, nor his hereditary ruler, should have the power to so change – for better or worse – his affairs, and be able to make such changes in his personal mode of living as he willed. This explanation is clearly insuf ficient. No man in his senses will assert that the general discontent and ferment of today were never heard of in the latter nineties, and the dreams – silly day-dreams, no doubt, but still the dreams – of the masses, of certainly some provinces, of today were known in the last years of the last century. But it must be remembered that the germs of all that has come to life today existed then, and long before the first years of the twentieth century. Again, it must be remembered that the last years of Lord Curzon’s rule have been years of extraordinary unrest in Asia.
The Chinese boycott of American goods, the assurance of the continued integrity of China, the commencement of the Reform movement in that country, the success of Japan against Russia, and the certainty that the Far East will remain Asiatic, have deeply impressed the Indian mind. Lastly, and above all, the comparative success of the revolution in Russia, the collapse of autocracy and the granting of votes to the Tartar Muhammadans and the Jews, have turned the heads of other Asiatics, otherwise calm, wise, and sane people. All these events occurred during the last years of Lord Curzon’s Viceroyalty, and those who look upon today’s unrest as the result of the rule of one individual may well be advised to ponder on all these world-events, and be asked to say if they think it was within the range of possibility for a Viceroy of India, however absolute, to prevent any one of the above mentioned occurrences. No one man could have done that, perhaps not even the Emperors Nicholas and William.
We must not, however, accept the theory that the present unrest is due to these external movements. No greater mistake could be made. Unless the soil of the country contained the germs of the malady of discontent, all such foreign movements would have only raised curiosity, but not that general sense of discontent that is today apparent. All historical examples indicate that though the outward signs of discontent may be due to external influences, the existence itself of discontent cannot pos sibly be due to foreign causes. To understand the question, “Why is the Indian of today discontented?” we must turn our gaze towards the internal movements of India and study the acts of the central Government. Perhaps the fearless application of the inductive method when considering the acts of the Government of India and the present state of civilisation in that· country will show us the primary cause of the unrest that is today apparent to all, except the willingly blind. Is this primary cause to be found in the most quoted of the so-called “faults” of British rule in India?
Let us examine them and try to see if they are really such as to cause disaffection and, if so, if they are remediable … We will examine some of the measures suggested by various Indian and European thinkers for changing the ferment and perhaps discon tent of today into a healthy affection that shall, when united with the loyalty to the Throne which today undoubtedly exists, make of India as surely and truly a source of strength to the Empire as Scotland or Ulster.
One school of thinkers, of whom Mr. Hyndman and Mr.
Naoroji are the extremest and best known representatives in England, and who are more or less followed by the leaders of the Congress Party in India and by some of the English politicians and thinkers who have taken an active and sympathetic interest in Indian affairs, maintain that British rule has greatly impoverished India and that the country is getting poorer every day. This is an enormous question, and volumes have been written on both sides. We must, however, remember that the grand arguments used by Mr. Hyndman and his friends are purely deductive, and that after assuming general laws -just as did the old schoolmen – they try and arrive at necessary conclusions about the growing poverty of India. We cannot for a moment accept such a priori reasoning nor its conclusions. The question, “Is India getting poorer or richer?” must be studied ak posteriori; we must take the general standard of living, the volume of trade, the habits of the people, and many other facts into consideration, then compare carefully the facts of today with the records of the past and the oral traditions of the people, and thus arrive at conclusions, not so clearly necessary as the a priori ones arrived at by Mr. Hyndman and the best known Congress leaders from assumed premisses, but infinitely truer and more resembling the actual facts. I venture to defY any one to prove on historical and economical facts that India is getting poorer. We have many grounds of comparison. There is the case of Upper Burma, “‘:here native rule disappeared only within our own times, and where comparisons with the past can be easily made.
According to the a priori methods of the poverty-of-India school, the Burmans must be daily getting poorer and poorer, the standard of life must be deteriorating, and the Burman’s power of exchanging his commodities, rights and services must be falling off. All the so-called “drains” on India that are sup posed to have bled India to famine have been now at work in Upper Burma for nearly twenty years. We therefore ought to see the beginning of the effects. The Burman ought to be spending a little less on his household and find some difference in his domestic economy. A priori reasoning from Mr. Hyndman’s assumptions leads us necessarily in this case to the same con clusions bravely arrived at and constantly proclaimed re India.
Now has that been the case in Burma? Not at all; on the contrary.
All and every sign of greater wealth and of greater general pros perity is to be found in that province. Any individual who will give his time to the study of Upper Burman economic affairs will be surprised at the marvellous results of British rule in the material prosperity of the inhabitants. I venture to say that com parison of the facts of today as to the life of the people with the past in every province of India will prove that the a priori reasoners have been greatly at fault in their conclusions, and that the continent is in every way more prosperous than it ever was.
If we compare the British Indians with the subjects of the native States, the result is in no way such as to support Mr. Hyndman’s theories. It must also be remembered that under the present arrangement the British Indian subject pays for the greater part of the army that protects the subject of the native States as well as himself. Thus it would not be surprising if the British Indian was not as well off as his “protected” neighbours. No doubt certain classes, such as the agricultural labourers and the small farmers, have not benefited as much by British rule as the traders, labourers, and the urban population generally. But, in com parison with their forefathers, I cannot conceive that any one (who is familiar with the social history of India, during the reign of the Moghuls for instance) will maintain that the agricultural classes have got poorer.
I cannot conceive an impartial student who knows about the facts of the past denying an actual and very material improve ment. Personally, after years of study and perusal of various Persian books, reports, &c., of the Moghul period, I feel pro foundly convinced of a general and progressive increase of prosperity in India even amongst the rural population. Nor am I alone in this conclusion; the great majority of English officials in India, whose knowledge of the economic position of the masses is unrivalled, are of the same opinion. Many Indic:tn publicists, some of whom, like the late Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, were the children and in their youth the contemporaries of people who had known Moghul rule, have often proclaimed that the standard of living and all the general signs of prosperity have increased.
No doubt conclusions arrived at by the study of facts have not the prim neatness of those arrived at by a priori reasoning. But since when has political economy become a geometric science?
Surely it belongs to the inductive sciences, and conclusions drawn, howsoever hesitatingly, and with as many exceptions as possible, from facts, are worth all the syllogisms of Mr. Hyndman and his friends? We cannot put down the discontent of today to the impoverishment of the people; this is, I think, undeniable.
However, we must not assume, as some officials and optimists of the Anti-Congress Party assume, that because the masses are slowly but surely getting richer there can be no real discontent.
This hasty assumption has led to a theory that I fear is a very real source of danger: certain European thinkers assume that as efficient administration will increase the prosperity of the Indian, and as material prosperity will increase contentment, all that the Government of India has to do is to improve the method of administration and develop the resources of the country, and then it has nothing more to worry about and can rest assured of love and fidelity. Such a one-sided, such a short-sighted view of human nature would be ludicrous were it not so dangerous.
Surely such thinkers forget that men do not live by bread alone, and that emotions and sentiments play as important a part in life as material wants and necessities Nor will any number of gorgeous ceremonies like the Durbar at Delhi, plus any amount of quick service trains and cheap telegrams and good canals, satisfy the complicated desires and dreams of the Indian of today. All these things will appeal to one side, and one side only, of human nature. Not even a cynic, unless he be a fool, would suggest that sentiment can be altogether forgotten in a European country or altogether satisfied by magnificence. The sooner Englishmen learn that human nature in India does not consist entirely of abdomen and eyes, the better for all concerned; the sooner Englishmen realise that the very railways and canals and efficient administration that raise material needs and satisfy them direcdy by making wealth more general raise moral and sentim~ntal needs indirectly which they are unable to satisfy, the better for all concerned. Is it wise in the long run to forget such sentiments, to pooh-pooh them as mere bunkum? Can any Government be considered permanent and safe as long as such sentiments remain unsatisfied? Does general wealth, the result of efficient administration, strengthen or weaken such sentiments? Far be it from me to run down efficient administration. It is one half of life certainly, but is it all life? Will a rich community require a greater or a lesser share in its government? History points to the fact that the very poorest and the most miserable have rarely rebelled, and that political discontent is much more likely to appear among those who have a competence but who do not possess the political and social advantages that they desire and their neighbours enjoy. The French Revolution was not made by the down-trodden peasants, the only people who bled under the old economic regime; the leaders of the revolutionary movement in France came from the middle classes; from the very classes that had gained most under the old regime, from the classes that supplied the Financiers and Intendants, who more than all the nobles and the Court benefited by the misery of the peasants.
Every child knows what classes supported Cromwell and the Par liamentary party. Even today from what sources are recruited the leaders of anarchy in Europe? Are the most dangerous anarchists of Italy Sicilian or Neapolitan peasants nursed into hatred of society by misery and poverty? or do they not come from Milan, Ancona, and Turin, and the prosperous North? Are they the sons of labourers and the submerged tenth of industrial Italy? Many other examples could be quoted to prove that mere material prosperity, the result of efficient administration, will not stop discontent. Far from it. The more wealth there is, the more leisure will there be; the more leisure, the more time for that half-thinking, half-dreaming state that usually precedes revolu tion. Small grievances that in the midst of grinding poverty and inefficient administration are borne and patiently attributed to the nature of things or to Divine wrath or justice, become unbear able in a society that has been used to efficiency and been made wealthy by it. Feelings of hate and revenge will in some hour when they are least expected and most dangerous break out from a materially prosperous but disaffected people. The wealthier such a population is, the more dangerous will it be if it ever rebels.
I fear that neither the Congress theory of increasing poverty as the cause of discontent, nor the official one of only efficient administration, plus slow and sure increase of wealth, as remedy, take in all the facts of India and human nature. They are alike wanting. The impoverishment theory is not true to the facts; the so-called remedy takes into consideration only half the facts, and deliberately forgets all the sentiments and all the aspirations that history and daily experience alike prove to be as equally needed by men as all the material comforts of life. In fact, the more successful the remedy, the greater will the disease be; the more efficient the administration, the lighter the taxes, the greater the wealth, the less will you find that readiness to accept being gov erned and ruled by mere commands from Viceroy or Executive Council that you found in the days of poverty and ignorance.
Let us now turn to other so-called faults of British rule, faults usually pointed out by some distinguished foreign visitors and by some non-Congress Indian thinkers. It is constantly asserted that Englishmen are unsympathetic in India, that Tommy Atkins quarrels with the lower classes, and that the occasional rows in railway carriages, hotels, &c., between Indians and Englishmen lead to ill-will. It is further insinuated by many foreign visitors that the absence of social intercourse between the brown and the white race accentuates political differences and makes griev ances that otherwise would not be noticed appear of great importance. These two points we will deal with one, after the other. Many officials assign a great deal of the discontent to the attacks made upon Indians by some Englishmen. Now what are the facts as they appear to the impartial student who com pares them with similar incidents in other parts of the world? Do French and German and American private soldiers never, late at night, when returning to barracks, quarrel with some chance passer-by? Is it quite unknown in England that in garrison towns sometimes a soldier hits a civilian when both are influenced by drink? Were such attacks ever more numerous in India than in European and American countries? The 9th Lancers incident, had it happened outside Lille or Breslau, would have undoubt edly been investigated by the police; but who would have dreamt of giving it any exceptional importance?
As to the second criticism of Englishmen in India so often made by foreign visitors and by some Indians, impartial consider ation of the facts will show them as wanting in foundation and reasonableness as the first one we have been discussing. The foreign visitor who arrives, and day after day visits European houses and goes from city to city without meeting a single Indian gentlell_lan, begins to assume that there are no natives whom he can meet on grounds of social equality; accidentally somewhere he meets an Indian gentleman or lady as well educated as himself, and at once he hastens to conclude that the English in India deliberately keep away from natives. He does not know that in India people are still living in compartments; there is less social intercourse between Mahomedan and Hindu or between Rajput and Parsi than between any of these races and the English in India. If there is aloofness, it is much more due to the Indian not unnaturally preferring his own section of the community to the others. As to the Indians who complain about not having enough intercourse with Englishmen, they are generally men who (probably for the most honourable reasons, such as breaking some caste rules) are not readily received by their own people, and thus wish to know the English, who, not being conversant with Indian customs, are shy to mix with them. Yet, even as things are, Englishmen, and Englishmen alone, receive and have friends amongst all classes and races. Where is the Hindu or Mahomedan who has so many devoted friends and admirers amongst all races as the late Sir J. Woodburn had in Calcutta, or Sir Lawrence Jenkins has in Bombay? Such men, respected and looked upon with affection by all races, are no doubt rare in India; but they are rare in every country. However, they prove that when the Hindu and Moslem and Parsi and Sikh and Rajput do find a common friend it is invariably a noble-hearted Englishmen, and that there is none of that want of sympathy with Indians socially on which some people constantly insist.
According to others – for we have not come yet to the last of those suggested causes of the unrest of today – the explanation lies in this fact, that India is a conquered country, and, whatever her foreign Government may do, the very nature of that rule will make it unpopular. To see if this theory will explain the facts let us turn to the history of India. Was ever India conquered as Gaul or Britain were by Rome? Was there ever such a place as India before various causes unified vast territories under the Crown of England? Were the Moghuls a national dynasty like the family of the Mikados in Japan? From the very first day when the East India Company began that career of conquest till today have we a single instance where Englishmen as mere conquerors attacked Indians? Throughout they were in alliance with the natives of the country. Princes and peasants alike turned by instinct to the white race for help against the internal and external enemies who were then fighting over the remains of the Moghul Empire.
More native troops fought for England in the dark days of the Mutiny than against her. To describe a confederation built on such lines as a conquered country is to forget the origin of British rule.
We have now come to the end of our hurried examination of various suggested causes of discontent and of some remedies, such as more efficient administration and slow growth of material prosperity. We have found them insufficient either to explain the facts or to prevent the mischief. Before venturing to· suggest what I consider to be the cause, and a remedy for the unsatisfactory position of affairs in India, I must explain why it is necessary to change the system, and why its continuance will in the long run endanger British rule. The fact that the fighting races, such as Silrns, Rajputs, Goorkhas, and Mahomedans, have not so far been affected by the form of discontent known in the older British provinces cannot be a source of comfort to us. We will begin by taking the Mahomedans, because they are probably the most compact and numerous body who have kept themselves aloof from political movement. There is danger of the Mahomedan attitude being misunderstood. It is not, as some people fondly imagine, mere opposition to concessions on the part of the British Government towards the Indians. It is a desire to have changes introduced different from those advocated by the Con gress representatives. We will take two instances. Mahomedans are no more satisfied than Hindus with the present system by which the Government of India and the local Governments name their representatives to the various legislatures. But instead of wanting mere territorial representation which they consider alike unsuited to the religious and racial differences and to the present state of moral civilisation, they require a special system of rep resentation, which their spokesmen have already placed before the Government of India. Though they do not want the present official majority to be reduced, and the power of the Government over legislation brought down to the mere veto of the Viceroy or Governor (an evil system which they firmly believe will leave all legislative power to the majority of elected members); they still desire to have larger legislative bodies. Again, they are anxious for a university of their own at Aligarh. Their leaders constantly assure them that the future of their faith and the revival of their artistic and literary powers depends upon it. This does not mean that they welcome the making of higher education more expensive. If the Mahomedan rank and file are once convinced that their aloofness from the agitation of today means that it will lead to the mere marking of time, and perhaps even reaction, I feel convinced that no amount of influence from the leaders and the elders will keep them from joining the Conservative section of the Congress Party. My reason for mentioning these things is merely to prove my contention that the attitude of the Mahome dans does not justify a mere negative position on the part of the Government, and that their particular and detailed objections to the representative system asked for by the Congress Presidents annually do not weaken the forces of discontent, for such are due to general causes and not to the details of any system.
As to the Sikhs, Rajputs, Goorkhas, it is only a matter of time before they think as Bengalese and Mahrattas, &c. The railways, posts, telegraphs, and canals that efficient administration intro duces are influencing even these races. Their stolidity has so far kept them a great deal outside the political movement, but even that is giving way before the communications and schools of today. The Punjab is a case in point. It would be impossible to exaggerate the change that has come over the political feelings of its inhabitants within the last seven or eight years. Lahore is politically becoming a suburb of Calcutta. Nor can feelings be changed except by the removal of their radical cause. I fear those who get some comfort from the so-called opposition of these races to the discontented section of British Indians are, unless the discontent itself is removed, destined to a rude awakening.
The belief, not often expressed, but ever remembered by some of those thinkers who really guide the policy of England towards India, we are compelled to discuss and criticise here. U nfortu nately want of space obliges me to do so hastily. It is thought that though the majority of natives be dissatisfied, and though the ranks of the discontented be increased by the addition of other classes and races, it does not really matter as long as England maintains a strong executive in the country, and is strong enough materially to compel obedience in India. It is shortly stated that the foundation of British rule is the military and naval power of England, plus the energy of English Viceroys, civilians, &c., and the excellence of the local communications. One of the most thoughtful of the journals published in the English language (the Times of India) recently said, and rightly, that, whatever the amount of discontent in India, there was as little likelihood of physical danger to British rule as of India being buried under snow. It went on to give expression to the central idea which I am now trying to examine, and said that it was because the rulers knew their overwhelming strength that they did not often talk about it, and did not care seriously for the noisy demonstrations of the natives.* This view of the matter is undoubtedly true. If we consider the immediate state of political affairs, it is no more than the stub born fact. Though no thinker can ever forget the .e thical and moral questions raised by reliance on force, we will in this paper try to show that even from a purely material view mere strength is insufficient to hold India permanently. Undoubtedly if we take a short view of the question, if we think in years and decades, force alone is ample to assure British supremacy. But if we take long views of things … the conclusion is different.
Apart from the grim possibilities of foreign war, it should never be forgotten that the overwhelming strength of England is greatly due to the isolated position of India. That vast country is at present practically an island. Turkey and Persia (both feeble States) play the part of non-conductors on the west; on the north Mghanistan and Chinese Turkestan and Thibet, and on the east China herself, prevent that contact with living forces and move ments which would revolutionise matters. Things cannot continue for ever in this ideal state. Three forces even now are at work, and any of them would be ample to cause great changes.
Germany may well reach Baghdad with her Anatolian Railway.
Though I cannot conceive of any danger to England,f rom the Indian Mahomedans through the so-called Pan-Islamic move ment, yet the effect produced on the Indian mind generally, and especially on the disaffected classes, by the presence of a Great Power so near would be enormous. A railway to Baghdad, even if it came no nearer, would necessarily make the Gulf a great centre of Indian commercial activity. The opportunities that such intercourse would offer to the great and vigorous Power that built that railway of intriguing with the discontented in India, should there be differences with England over Holland, South America, or some Mediterranean country, would be enough to unsettle the native mind and to require a vastly greater white garrison if England is to keep India by force alone.
Secondly, sooner or later, whatever the result of the present revolution, the Indian and Russian railways will somehow or other meet. Whatever be the state of Anglo-Russian relations, and what ever the form of the Russian Government, the power of the *I am writing this paper on board ship in the Yellow Sea, and thus am quite unable to verify any of my references to various articles, speeches, &c. However, I do not believe that I have misrepresented the meaning of the particular article in the Times of India to which I have referred. discontented party in India will be at once enormously increased, for the isolation that makes the Government of India resemble that of Rome in having no neighbours and being for its subjects the only possible Power would disappear.
Thirdly, we have the possible awakening and development of China. One need not be a believer in the Yellow Peril to imagine a China, assured of her continued national existence through her own strength, carrying on a great commerce and freely com municating with India through Szechuan, Yunan or possibly even Thibet. That too would change the whole nature of that enor mous superiority which is absolute today. Nor will it at all help England to build the connecting railways herself and to directly or indirectly own the intermediate States to meet Russia at Herat, Germany at Mosul or Aleppo, Japan and others on the Yang-Tse, if India is discontented and held by force alone. For such is the commercial activity of the Indian, and such his ability to underlive as well as overlive his Arab, Persian, and Mghan neighbours, that what is happening today in Burma and Baluchistan would come to pass; gradually the natives of such newly conquered States would become intellectually Indians, and would be, were India discontented, affected by the same poison. Were a railway carried through Mghanistan, in a few years the Mghans would be as much affected by what may come to be known as the Indian movement as the subjects of the Nizam and the Gaikowar. The only result of such extension of British power would be, were India discontented and held by force alone, that, instead of having three hundred millions of discontented Asiatic subjects, she would have three hundred and fifty or four hundred millions, and, instead of meeting her neighbours far away from their base, she would meet them on their base. Those who care not for the contentment of India’s native population forget that the disintegration of such a polity is sure to happen the moment it meets external forces. This impact may be felt through war or commercial competition and exchange or mere influence of ideas. Whatever the details, the foundations of a purely forcible Government will not stand the dissolving forces introduced by constant contact with external policies. There could be only one scientifically perfect method of permanently occupying India in spite of the permanent discontent of her races. Had she a tem perate climate, and were her races wanting in natural vitality, her native population might vanish like some other weaker races under Anglo-Saxon dominion. In the case of India such a result is out of the question. With the exception of a few so-called aborigines, her people are free from those natural weaknesses that lead to racial death. We are now forced to the conclusion though we could bring forward many other arguments in support of our contention – that, taking really long views, as thoughtful men should when discussing matters of such importance, it is necessary for England to possess the affection or at least to prevent the hostility of her Indian subjects if she wishes to rule the country permanently. ‘ Nor is it by any means what I may be permitted to call a “hopeless case.” Were one to select the most disaffected men in India to-day and approach them, ninety-nine out of each hundred would say frankly that they greatly preferred what has been by Mr. Gokhale described as the “Colonial Ideal” to one of separation as their national dream. The vast majority of the other 1 per cent., some of whom openly encourage anti-British ideals, will not deny that they would much prefer the Colonial ideal, but that, as they consider it hopeless, they are compelled to go in for the extremest of all possible views. This phenomenon in itself, this clinging of all to some dream of connection with England, shows that there is no really insuperable difficulty, if the matter were dispassionately considered, in bringing an end to the discontent. Race instinct is not the dividing line. And since it is possible for England to possess the affection of her Indian subjects, is it not worth her while at whatever cost- except, of course, honour and safety- to win that love to which she has so many splendid claims? The advantages would be enormous. Were the people of India as mentally satisfied and contented with British rule as they are emotionally loyal to the Throne of England, England alone of all the Great Powers could with safety be permanently free of conscription as understood on the Conti nent. Were India satisfied, England could safely devote more of her resources towards the improvement of the condition of her working classes, and introduce with greater ease such social reforms as old-age pensions, &c., for which the majority of her people seem so anxious, for the princes and people of India would, moved by patriotic reasons, take a far more active and real interest in the military state of their country than they do at present. England would then possess in India a source of man power which, plus her sea-power and wealth, would make her the only absolutely invulnerable State in the world – far more so even than the United States.
How can India be contented? Shall we accept the Congress programme at once? Before we can do so we must understand clearly what the pith of that programme is. We must take off the silver coatings and look at the actual pill these gentlemen offer us. Now the main recommendation of the Congress is this: The Government of India’s legislative power and its financial authority _ which in the long run means all her rights and strengths should be handed over, by perhaps gradual steps, to the people of the country, and the executive should be made mainly Indian.
Will the security of British rule and the honour of England allow her to accept this programme? . . . In putting forward my reasons for this belief I will arrive at what I firmly believe to be the real cause of discontent, and what can be in that case its only possible remedy. For if the real power was given over to the people’s representatives how would they use it? Would they be satisfied to be led by a very few who are like Mr. Gokhale and many of the accomplished leaders in Bengal, not only intellectu ally distinguished, but free from all those social prejudices that are the real curse of India? No one who knows the average graduate will think so. Whatever the material or educational test of the franchise, the result would be, under the present state of social civilisation, that power would fall into the hands of indi viduals or communities who, while in many things abreast of the century, are in other things full of prejudices against the lower classes of their countrymen, unworthy of the days of the Tudors.
It must not be forgotten that many of those who are demanding the highest political rights deny at this moment to their own dearest and nearest female relatives the simplest of human rights.
If the elected legislators were really powerful, we can well antici pate the type of laws that would satisfY the “educated electors.”
In such a contingency the dissatisfaction of the masses and of the social reformers with English rule, the new “Parliament,” and the new laws would be ever so much greater than today, and infinitely more justifiable. Are we, then, to put the blame on the people who are so full of prejudices, and address them: “Use the liberties you already possess – make them general, you shall then have more”? Such a cold and unsympathetic attitude would be alike unjust and unreasonable. These prejudices have existed so long that, without the indirect help of the Government, they may well take centuries to disappear. Dissatisfaction is not owing to the absence of political concessions made to the people, but to the fact that the public do not see themselves getting appreciably fitter, notwithstanding all the universities, schools, &c., for ever exercising reasonable political power. It must not be imagined that because the lower and middle classes of the towns and villages, the 20 per cent. that count most in India, do not talk of the Queen’s proclamation, they have never heard of it or have forgotten it. Certainly the word proclamation is unknown to most of them. But there is a very distinct idea that when the late Queen-Empress assumed the government a distinct promise was made that no difference except “fitness” would exist between her Indian and English subjects, and that step by step everything would be done to raise the brown to the level of the white. The very schools and colleges that became general ‘after 1858 the poor Indian vaguely associated with this policy of improving him.
Now fifty years have passed; the schools have done wonders. Yet he knows that, whatever his intellectual powers, he is not very much nearer than before 1858 to the level of his white ruler morally. He is disenchanted, and the necessary result follows discontentment.
He wants to know when the first earnest steps in raising him morally will be taken. The official answer is cold and distant. The business of the Government is merely to keep law and order; it has no more to do with other improvements than with religion.
Quite so. But the Indian qualifies the word business with the adjective direct. The direct business of all Governments is to lzeep law and order. But indirectly every Government (no Government more so than that of England herself, through the example of her Sovereign) encourages those who work amongst the people for the moral and social improvement of the masses. Even the Government of India as at present constituted does a little by the conferring of honours on philanthropists to encourage social reform. The question is one of degree. Does the Indian Govern ment as at present constituted possess any individual or department that can efficiently help towards the betterment of the social condition of the people? Can a political Viceroy already crushed with the affairs of State take that constant interest in various movements for social reform that should be taken if such improvement is to be due to his influence? Has he the time to encourage or initiate such movements? Of all the reforms carried by successive Viceroys since 1877 probably none will appear to the historian of such real benefit to the people as the medical aid offered by what is known as the Lady .D ufferin Fund. It would not be difficult to suggest at least a hundred similar social movements that, with the same encouragement and attention from similarly exalted quarters, would be as beneficial to India as what will be ever associated, through Lady Dufferin’s activity, with Lord Dufferin’s administration. Nor can reform movements, if they are to be efficient and include the many needs of the people, be left to the influence of a consort only. They require the guidance of the representative of the Crown, and his whole time and thought. The delicate nature of such work makes it impossible for a department or councillor to carry it out. It requires the prestige and the influence of the highest authority.
However, these a!”e not the only disadvantages. The example of a political Viceroy working night and day at political affairs and sparing odd moments only from his very short hours of recreation for helping social reform is catching. Naturally many of the best minds in India, many of the most selfless of her sons, whose real province of labour is the betterment of their own castes, unconsciously influenced by the example of the Viceroy, give up their time and thought to political matters. How impossible political reform is while social and racial prejudices continue is the cardinal fact of Indian life. Thus a deadlock arises. Both the English and Indians, who are busy inventing solutions for political problems, forget that no such can be effective under present social conditions. Even in England, which is a nation generations ahead of India, the influence of the Crown used for the benefit of the masses had and has as much to do with the general raising of the standard of civilisation as all the laws passed by Parliament. The stupendous voluntary work done for improving the condition of the people in that country is essentially due to the example of the chief of the State. Again, England enjoys the great boon of having a head of the State who is above all political parties, and who enjoys the loyalty of all. In India there is no individual who, being above political and sectional ques tions, can ever attract such universal and unifYing veneration. Of course, we have the Emperor. But he is not on the spot, and he is represented by one who is intimately associated with and pri marily responsible for political decisions, and who is, and will be, as intelligence becomes more general, even more freely criticised.
His acts and speeches may sometimes raise feelings that are not such as should be felt for the representative of a universally beloved Sovereign. Nor can it be reasonably expected that the present system can have any other result.
What is the remedy? To the writer’s mind there is one and one alone that can assure the natural, gradual, and healthy growth of political freedom in India and unite her for ever to England by sentiment, gratitude, and self-interest. That remedy was sug gested by one who is not only one of the most important of India’s ruling princes, but who enjoys the confidence and the esteem of the Indian public to a remarkable degree – the Gaikowar of Baroda. His Highness, at the Bombay Social Reform Conference, after an exhaustive review of the state of civilisation in the country, rightly said that one remedy alone could put an end to the present state of affairs. That was to change. the consti tution of the Government of India – to abolish the political Viceroyalty and to institute a non-political Regency, with a descendant of the Sovereign as a permanent Prince Regent. I am compelled not to enter into the detailed examination of the many political and other advantages of such a change of system alike to England and India, though I hope to resume the con sideration of such on some future occasion. However, certain aspects of the question I am forced to inquire into, howsoever hastily, in order to show that there is nothing really impossible about it. The Imperial Titles Act was an instalment of a policy towards India that can be crowned only by some change such as advocated by the Gaikowar. The two principal criticisms of that proposal we are forced to consider. The first one shows the slovenly thinking that is responsible for half the mischief in India.
It was actually suggested that the Indian, being an Oriental, could not understand a non-political and irresponsible ruler, that such an authority would not be in keeping with the genius of Ea.Stern races, and that he would constantly associate the Prince with the acts of his advisors. What wonderful wisdom! What knowledge of Oriental history! What was the actual position of an hereditary Hindu r~a before the country was influenced by the Tartar or Turkish conquerors of Kashmir, and before the Mahomedan invasion, when new ideas (entirely new, and due to Islam) as to the position of the ruler were introduced into India? The r~a, unless he happened to be a usurper or the immediate descendant of one, was the head of society, the representative of the Divine.
In his name and by his grace the administration was carried on.
But the officers of the State were responsible for political affairs, and they were criticised by the people. Nepaul is today an example of a perfect Hindu polity very little influenced by Islam.
Her ruler holds exactly the position that is naturally given by the Hindu mind to the Divine representative, his Sovereign. The political authority is carried on by the Ministers. Again, Japan was for centuries, and would have been even now but for foreign influences, reigned over by irresponsible but unusually rever enced emperors … To describe systems that prevailed usually in ancient Hindu States, and even now prevail in all the countries influenced by Buddhism, as un-Oriental merely shows the self satisfied ignorance of such critics.
The second criticism was that the attacks of the native Press would then be directed against a member of the Royal Family.
As for this, were a Prince sent out as Viceroy, and the office remained, as at present, a political and responsible one, no doubt the Prince Regent too would be freely criticised like Viceroys at present. But the whole point is that the office would be changed as well, and the Regent would be as little responsible for any act of his advisors as the King-Emperor. Under such an arrangement it is quite inconceivable that the Indian Press should make attacks on the representative of their Emperor. The political work done under the present system would be entrusted to a Prime Minister sent out every five or six years from England, who would be the President of the Executive Council.
Amongst the many advantages of such a system would be the fact that the influence of the Civil Service Members of the Council would be considerably increased indirectly. Any one who knows the splendid work of that service, and their true, though not advertised, sympathy with India, would welcome this increase.
Another great advantage would be that while the dangers of responsible Government would be avoided, the disadvantages of the autocratic rule of today, already out of date, would dis appear; for the Prime Minister, not having the prestige of being Viceroy, would be more thoroughly criticised by his Council than at present, and his hasty decisions would never appear before the public. Above all, the Government would have the advice, the knowledge, the experience of the Regent to guide them; for, of course, as in all constitutional countries, the Ministry or Council would have, when submitting their measures, to explain clearly all their reasons to the Regent. Of course, the Regent must be a very near relative, son or grandson, of the Sovereign. Coming out to India at about the same age as a Civil Servant usually does, for some thirty years’ Regency, the Prince can retire from office soon after he is fifty. Round the Regent slowly would gather all the most earnest men of India, chiefs and princes downwards.
Political questions would receive the amount of interest and importance due to them, and not, as at present, practically mon opolise Indian public life. The Regent, being free from political cares, would put himself at the head of all movements, social, literary, economic and artistic, that improved the relations of all sections of society, that destroyed racial and religious particular isms, that helped to amalgamate the parts into a healthy whole.
Sympathy the Government of India lacks, because its Constitution prevents its members from having the time to take an active interest in the emotional life and social progress of the people.
The Prince would soon get to be acquainted with the life of the people considered as a whole. The social reforms carried would, being due to the guidance of the Regent and the free choice of the people, be the best possible school for learning the secret of political freedom that India can ever possess. The Prince’s interest in national life as a whole would elevate it by attracting to its service many of the best brains now wasted in the arid field of political controversy. Political changes so constantly prayed for would then come naturally, and be welcomed alike by India and England, for they would be the result of mutual understanding.
One may say with as much certitude as such contingent judg ments admit that under such a Regency India can be governed for eighty or ninety years at least without any political change in the real character of its government, and with benefit alike to her own people and to the Empire. Even then the political changes which came would be gradual, and would not in any way anticipate the moral ideas of the country, for voluntary social reforms would have preceded all others. And the government would be, in the meanwhile, not merely the exercise of authority by superior force, but the exercise of such rights by a Regent who would possess the love of all classes. England would regain, as one improvement after another assured the peopl~ of the benefits of her rule, that contentment which pessimism has now stolen from her. And the imagination of the people of India, once so powerfully impressed by the superior benefits of British rule, would again be, like the intellect of those races, impressed by the superior and disinterested political morality of her rulers.* Will Englishmen ever consider these questions impartially and act on their merits, or will the innate conservatism of the race prevent them from such bold political speculations? Will the great Liberal Party take the first steps towards preparing the Indian subjects of the King for taking their proper place in his Empire?
Or will the party that is deeply interested in federation and union of the Empire remove the canker of discontent in India by giving that country a Government suited to her present state of develop ment, and thus, by crowning the work of the two Conservative *When English rule was at first established it appealed to the imagination of the people through its two great principles – absolute religious toleration and equal justice. However, the people have now become so used to these two things that they look on them as matters of course, and the lower classes especially have become incapable of conceiving of an intolerant or an unjust Government. Their very ignorance has helped to make them forget the state of affairs that prevailed in the eighteenth century and earlier.
Governments of 1858 and 1876, strengthen the Empire? Let the Indian pray that it will be no party matter, but that England as a whole will take this most important of all her measures for raising, in the fullness of time, the greatest of her foster-children to the level of her own daughter nations:
Source: National Review, London, February 1907, pp. 951-72.
The journal, a monthly of conservative views, was at this time edited by L. ].
Maxse.